A multidimensional valuation model of M&A transactions: the daimler-chrysler and the fiat-chrysler cases by Innerbichler , Roman
  
UNIVERSITA’ DEGLI STUDI DI PADOVA 
 
DIPARTIMENTO DI SCIENZE ECONOMICHE ED AZIENDALI 
“M.FANNO” 
 
 
CORSO DI LAUREA MAGISTRALE / SPECIALISTICA IN 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION - ECONOMIA E DIREZIONE 
AZIENDALE 
 
TESI DI LAUREA 
 
“A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VALUATION MODEL OF M&A 
TRANSACTIONS: THE DAIMLER-CHRYSLER AND THE FIAT-
CHRYSLER CASES” 
 
 
 
RELATORE: 
 
CH.MO PROF. FABIO BUTTIGNON 
 
 
 
LAUREANDO: ROMAN INNERBICHLER 
 
MATRICOLA N. 1103684 
 
 
 
ANNO ACCADEMICO 2015 – 2016 
  
   
Il candidato dichiara che il presente lavoro è originale e non è già stato sottoposto, in tutto o in 
parte, per il conseguimento di un titolo accademico in altre Università italiane o straniere.  
Il candidato dichiara altresì che tutti i materiali utilizzati durante la preparazione dell’elaborato 
sono stati indicati nel testo e nella sezione “Riferimenti bibliografici” e che le eventuali citazioni 
testuali sono individuabili attraverso l’esplicito richiamo alla pubblicazione originale. 
 
Firma dello studente 
 
_________________ 
 
 
  
Table of Content 
1. Abstract .............................................................................................................................. - 1 - 
2. Mergers, acquisitions and value creation: an overview.......................................................... - 2 - 
2.1 The concept of growth ................................................................................................. - 2 - 
2.2 Motivations for M&A activities .................................................................................. - 5 - 
2.2.1 The Synergy Theory .............................................................................................. - 5 - 
2.2.2 Transactions cost and Internationalization theory ................................................. - 7 - 
2.2.3 The agency theory ................................................................................................. - 7 - 
2.2.4 The resources dependency theory ......................................................................... - 8 - 
2.2.5 The market theory ................................................................................................. - 8 - 
2.2.6 The resource theory ............................................................................................... - 8 - 
2.3 M&A in practice ........................................................................................................ - 10 - 
2.3.1 Managerial Motivations for M&A activities ....................................................... - 10 - 
2.3.2 Managerial Motives – a STUDY ........................................................................ - 14 - 
2.3.3 The M&A Process ............................................................................................... - 15 - 
2.3.4 Defining and measuring success of a M&A transaction ..................................... - 19 - 
3. The Daimler-Chrysler case ...................................................................................................... - 20 - 
3.1 The history of the two automotive colossuses ........................................................... - 20 - 
3.2 “The marriage under equals” ..................................................................................... - 23 - 
3.2.1 Motivations for the merger .................................................................................. - 23 - 
3.2.2 The timeline......................................................................................................... - 25 - 
3.2.3 Details of the deal ................................................................................................ - 26 - 
3.2.4 The post-merger restructuring ............................................................................. - 27 - 
3.3. The failure of DaimlerChrysler ................................................................................. - 28 - 
3.3.1 Operational problems .......................................................................................... - 28 - 
3.3.2 Junior status and cultural differences .................................................................. - 31 - 
3.3.3 Mismanagement .................................................................................................. - 32 - 
4. Chrysler during the financial crisis ......................................................................................... - 33 - 
4.1 Chrysler’s troubles and the acquisition by Cerberus Capital ..................................... - 33 - 
4.2 Chrysler’s bailout ....................................................................................................... - 34 - 
4.2.1 The financial crisis and the consequences for the US automotive industry ........ - 34 - 
4.2.2 The decision, the bailout and new start ............................................................... - 35 - 
5. Fiat S.p.a. .................................................................................................................................... - 37 - 
5.1 Fiat in the 21st century ............................................................................................... - 37 - 
5.2 Marchionne the savior................................................................................................ - 38 - 
5.3 FIAT and the financial crisis...................................................................................... - 41 - 
6. The FCA era ............................................................................................................................... - 42 - 
6.1 The strategy for a full merger .................................................................................... - 42 - 
6.2 The timeline ............................................................................................................... - 44 - 
7. A valuation model for M&A transactions .............................................................................. - 46 - 
7.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................ - 46 - 
7.2 Research Design ........................................................................................................ - 47 - 
7.3 Calculations ............................................................................................................... - 60 - 
7.4 Limitations ................................................................................................................. - 61 - 
7.5 The DaimlerChrysler and Fiat Chrysler Cases .......................................................... - 63 - 
7.5.1 Application of the model – DaimlerChrysler ...................................................... - 63 - 
7.5.2 Application of the model – The Fiat-Chrysler Case ........................................... - 74 - 
7.6 Comparison of the two mergers ................................................................................. - 85 - 
8. Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. - 87 - 
 
- 1 - 
1. Abstract 
The trend towards worldwide globalization, intense international competition as well as the rise 
of free trade unions has led to new and unknown economic circumstances. Most of the 
companies had to admit openly that their own resources would not be sufficient in order to 
expand globally and to stay competitive in the future. This reflects the tendency of companies 
to expand internationally through a series of strategic alliances and partnerships, same as 
alternatively through the idea of growing by merging or acquiring competitors or strategically 
important companies. The highly competitive field of producing and selling automobiles was 
one of the first sectors where the new merger wave of the early 2000s appeared. Managers 
expected that the obtained synergies, on the one hand, were essential to surviving and remaining 
competitive in the future and, on the other, would justify high premiums paid for the acquisition 
of targets. However, as Camara & Renjen (2004) stated, more than half of the M&A 
transactions fail to create value. The most well-known case is the failed fusion of Daimler-Benz 
and Chrysler, generally known as the “Merger of Equals” (Finkelstein, 2002) in the early 2000s. 
However, what were the determining factors of the failure?  
Despite this bad example, the automotive sector has recently seen a fusion of two major players 
namely Fiat S.P.A. and Chrysler Group LLC, which together formed the newly founded entity 
of Fiat Chrysler Automobiles N.V. 
This thesis aims to accomplish three objectives. In the first part, the theory of value creation in 
M&A activities will be explained, as well as the empirical results of the success drivers in those 
transactions. The entire process of merger and acquisition transactions will be described and 
analyzed, with a focus on the most important steps toward a successful implementation.  
The aim of the second part of this thesis is to explore the main differences of the Fiat-Chrysler 
deal in comparison with the failed merger of Daimler-Chrysler and to quantify the value created 
by FCA through its various synergies and improvements.  
Besides the cultural differences, the legal structure as well the different approaches, the main 
goal of this thesis is to give an analysis of the macroeconomic circumstances as well as the 
general compatibility of the two merger candidates. Looking at the empirical results, the 
research of pre-merger success factors and the post-merger integration process, I am trying to 
identify the distinctive factors for a successful merger or acquisition. 
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2. Mergers, acquisitions and value creation: an overview 
2.1 The concept of growth 
Enterprises seek growth. The reasons why corporations want to grow, however, can differ 
greatly. Riley (2016) emphasizes five major reasons, namely: 
Profit motives: Companies try to grow in order to obtain higher profits and, therefore, 
better returns for their shareholders. Secondly, the share price and hence the market 
capitalization depend on the growth predictions.  
Cost motives: By growing the business, most of the companies expect to achieve 
different economies of scale or scope that lead to lower average costs.  
Market power motives: A company may want to become large in order to increase its 
market share and therefore archive an improved pricing power as well as a better 
monopsony power. 
Risk motives: By increasing size through growth, diversification of sales and income 
can be obtained. The smoothening of earnings leads to a decreased probability of 
default. 
Managerial motives: Lastly, growth can also be explained in the managerial desire to 
expand as well as their compensation plans, which are often correlated with some key 
financial ratios.  
Gümüs & Apak (2011) went further and described the enterprises’ quest for growth 
opportunities as the most viable strategy in order to maintain competitive advantage and 
profitability, two basic aims of every business.  
However, growth can be achieved throughout different ways. The most basic and natural form 
of growth is the concept of organic growth. The companies rely exclusively on their own 
resources and expand their businesses by accessing new markets, launching new products, and 
increasing the consumer base or through new sales.  
The traditional way of growing has definitely its advantages and upsides. 
Organic growth gives corporations the possibility to better coordinate and manage their 
expansion. In addition to that, it is generally agreed that this strategy of growing is relatively 
inexpensive, given that often most of the funding sources stem from retained earnings. Lastly, 
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communicational and cultural hurdles do not appear in comparison to external growth 
strategies.  
On the other hand, the downsides that are associated with internal growth should not be 
overlooked. Firstly, the company’s plan to grow can be thwarted by its competitors. Secondly, 
the obtained growth rates are minor and less predictable than the one that can be obtained from 
a strategy of external growth. Thirdly, legal barriers do limit the possibility of accessing certain 
markets. The best known example is the Chinese market, where the government has imposed a 
law that allows foreign automotive companies to access the market only if they cooperate with 
a local car producer.  
Meanwhile, many other corporate growth strategies have become more and more important. 
An alternative strategy of growth it the acquisition of resources of other companies or the 
drafting settle agreements. These strategies have proven to be attractive to many management 
boards. As has been mentioned already, the general assessment and definition of success 
nowadays depends majorly on the annual growth rates of sales and earnings. Hence, external 
growth strategies are a quick alternative for managers to boost their performance indicators. 
However, the fear of shareholders that value will be destroyed is often not ungrounded.  
The essential question, whether growth through acquisitions or merger create substantial value 
for the shareholder of the acquiring firm, has been discussed sufficiently. The value creation 
issue, however, will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Providing accurate definitions is key in order to understand the differences in external ways of 
growing. Reddy defines three major categories of inorganic external growth strategies (Reddy, 
2015).  
A. Strategic Alliances 
B. Joint Ventures 
C. Amalgamations 
For Gümüs & Apak (2011), strategic alliances are “agreements between two or more 
independent companies which come together to cooperate on the basis of a specific strategic 
aim. The different companies support and equip the alliance with resources of different kinds, 
like capital, know-how, production inputs or patents. The hope is that the combined an alliance 
will bring greater advantages and yield more important rates of growth, than would otherwise 
be achievable by each company separately.  
- 4 - 
Reddy defined joint ventures as “two or more organizations creating a new organization, which 
characterizes ownership, structure, mission, policies, governance, procedures and so on for 
achieving certain goals, while the predecessor organizations still exist” (Reddy, 2015, p. 253). 
Joint ventures are an intermediate level of forms of cooperation. Legally independent, the newly 
founded company can act freely and shares most of the synergy effects of a merger or 
acquisition. The fact that the original companies still exists, guarantees a survival in the case of 
failure of the joint venture. Furthermore, the entities do not have to share everything and can 
keep important assets out of the deal (i.e. patents).  
An amalgamation on the other hand, is a collective of several different external growth 
strategies, namely mergers, acquisitions, takeovers, buy-outs, and de-merger activities.  
A merger is the combination of two companies into a new entity, while an acquisition, instead, 
describes the purchase of one company by another. (Whitaker, 2013)  
Takeovers or buy-out consist in the decision of a firm to acquire the control of the target 
company with or without the consensus of the management of the target. The consensus 
determines if the deal is considered as friendly or hostile. (Reddy, 2015) 
M&A are nevertheless considered to be the most important category. In general, there are three 
different types of fusions or acquisitions: 
Horizontal mergers: a business combination at the same level of production and trade. 
The reasons for those mergers are mainly potential economies of scale, the acquisition 
of know-how or the obtainment of better conditions on the suppliers’ side.  
Vertical mergers: can be subdivided into backward and forward mergers. The former 
describes a linking between an acquirer and a level upstream of production or trade 
(suppliers). The latter, on the other hand, defines the fusion of an acquirer and a level 
downstream (clients). The benefits are in cost savings due to the improved management 
of inventory and logistics.  
Conglomerate mergers: encapsulates the fusion of two businesses with uncorrelated 
levels of production or trade, in other words businesses of different types. The major 
driver for such M&A’s is risk diversification in growth patterns. 
For the further elaboration of the theory of M&A, it is crucial to fully understand the differences 
between merger and acquisitions. A fundamental characteristic both of them share is that 
ownership of both existing firms changes. 
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The acquisition describes the purchase of a stake in the target company. The acquired company, 
however, remains a separate legal entity and therefore keeps its independence. Furthermore, the 
acquisitions are subdivided into two major categories, i.e. asset deal and share deal.  
Asset deal consists of the transfer of tangible- or intangible assets and hence the debit and credit 
positions of the target are shown separately in the balance sheet of the acquirer. The difference 
of the purchase price and the current value of the assets is called “goodwill” and implies an 
annually conducted impairment test to check for eventual depreciation.  
The transfer of ownership of the target company instead, characterizes the share deal. While 
the transaction itself is less complicated, there are nevertheless some features that merit specific 
mention. The acquisition can be of the full stakes (100%), majority stake (>50%) or just a 
minority stake (>10%) 
Mergers, on the other hand, are characterized by the full incorporation of the target’s assets and 
the discontinuation of its legal entity. This operation is called merger through absorption. In 
other words, a new entity is founded, containing all assets and liabilities of the both businesses 
(merger by means of new formation). 
Mergers are characterized by a combination of businesses with the highest degree of 
intertwining, mainly because at least one entity has to cease and hence to give up its legal 
independence. 
2.2 Motivations for M&A activities 
The reasons for merger and acquisitions are numerous and very different. Furthermore, they 
tend to vary over time and among sectors. However, it can be said that there are some 
fundamental theories that explain the key motivations. 
2.2.1 The Synergy Theory 
The most prominent theory for mergers and acquisitions is the synergy-theory or efficiency-
theory. The idea is that two or more businesses combine their assets and resources in a way that 
increases value. The word synergy originates from the Greek language and literally means 
“collaboration” in the sense of cooperation.  
However, economists look at the total effect of the combination of assets comparing them with 
the results and values of the companies prior to the merger, which unfortunately often turns out 
to be negative. Ansoff distinguished four different types of synergies (Ansoff, 1988): 
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1) Synergies of sales: through the usage of the combined channels of distribution, 
marketing or the inventory systems, sales improvements or cost reductions arise. 
2) Synergies in production: the increased degree of utilization of plants or machinery, 
personal or other capacities leads to cost reductions, which are mainly explained by 
the theory of learning curve and the concept of mass production.  
3) Synergies in investments: the combination of investments can lead to considerable 
savings applying an improved cost of capital rate or by cutting overlapping 
investments.  
4) Synergies in management: managerial skills and expertise can be freely transferred 
within the new corporation and can also reduce costs or improve the overall 
efficiency.  
Porter (1985) also tried to picture the concept of synergies. He considered synergies as being 
value chain oriented and called them “interrelations of business fields”. More precisely, Porter 
identified three different forms of interrelations: 
Material interrelations: Markets, Production; Supply, Technology; Infrastructure 
Immaterial interrelation: Know-How transfer 
Competitors interrelations: Overall positioning of the group 
Explanation of the origin of synergies 
The generally known concept of economies of scales describes the correlation between 
increased business size and the expected cost per unit. The falling cost per units can be 
explained looking at the fixed costs per unit that decrease when output rises. Applying this 
simplest theory of cost savings to the combination of business could explain most of the 
motivations for merger activities. However, there are several more.  
The second category of synergies is based on the so-called theory of economies of scope. 
Economies of scope appear, if the production of two or more different products by the same 
company is cheaper than the production of those same products in two separate and independent 
companies. In the case of only two products, the following rule holds: 
C(x1,x2) > C(x1) + C(x2) 
There are several reasons for economies of scope. Sudarsanam (2010) named the examples of 
products that may share the same technological basis, similar market or consumer groups.  
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The concept of the experience curve represents a second explanation for obtaining synergy 
effects. Four different sources build the base for this concept: 
1) Learning effects: per unit costs decrease through the learning process with 
increased accumulated output 
2) Technical progress: the improved production through various technical 
innovations reduces the units’ costs significantly 
3) Rationalization: process and product innovations can also contribute to lower per 
unit costs 
4) Size effects: economies of scale and the fix cost-degression effect  
2.2.2 Transactions cost and Internationalization theory 
The incomplete market intentionally creates transaction costs, such as cost for searching, 
contracting, informing, controlling, and so on. In other words activities that are involved around 
a transaction between two or more companies. The simple decision, whether a company should 
make or buy a product, can be deviated from this theory. The transaction costs heavily influence 
the decision and forms a second important motivation for M&A activities. 
Williamson (1986) spread this theory in an attempt to try to categorize those costs and 
developed a market transaction theory with three different kinds of coordination forms: market-
based, hybrid or hierarchical forms of coordination.  
Moreover, the transaction costs can differ depending on the asset specificity of the corporation. 
Mergers can provide the possibility of relocating resources and increasing their utilization.  
Based on this assumption, enterprises should organize and manage their business so as to 
minimize the sum of those transaction costs. 
Boesecke (2009) states that following the transaction theory, business combinations are only 
efficient if the sum of production and transaction costs is lower than in market transactions. 
2.2.3 The agency theory 
The agency theory derives from the well-known principal-agent problem in economics. The 
agent is allowed to act in the name of the principal; however, the wealth of the principal is 
directly influenced by the decisions taken by the agent. Given the asymmetrical information, 
the principal might be faced to monitor the behavior of its agent, which creates significant costs.  
In the field of M&A transactions, the agency theory is often used to explain certain merger 
activities. It could explain why an acquiring firm CEO may pay a premium to the target firm, 
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given that it is not at his expense. Eisenhardt (1989)stated that business combinations might be 
useful to reduce asymmetries and hence costs of monitoring.  
2.2.4 The resources dependency theory  
The dependence on rare resources as inputs for the production can justify merger or acquisitions 
of suppliers. The resource dependency theory therefore stands for using M&A to guarantee or 
at least to reduce the uncertainty of the inflow of main resources in order to increase the long-
term survival probability and independence of a corporation. The acquirer faces the opportunity 
to use the resources given in the target firm, leading to a total reduction in dependency. Pfeffer 
and Salancik (1978) named the RDT for the first time in 1978 in their publication of “The 
External Control of Organizations: A Resource Dependence Perspective”.  
2.2.5 The market theory  
The market theory stands for the explanation of mergers as seen by the market. The market-
based theory explains the success or failure of a business by the competitive situation of a 
company’s external product markets. The strategy plan of a company following the MBV 
depends on its customer’s needs and behavior. The management is asked to analyze the 
environmental circumstances and tries to position the business in the most attractive corner. 
The resources in the market- based view are homogenous and mobile. However, the starting 
point of the strategic positioning is not the combination of resources like in the resource-based 
view. As mentioned above, it always starts with the analysis of the market environment.  
Porter (1985) tried to emphasize the importance of the market theory with his well-known five-
forces model. In addition to the importance of the industry attractiveness, Porter highlighted the 
relative competitive positioning of the company within the industry.  
The competitive position can be achieved by pursuing one of three generic strategies: cost 
leadership, differentiation or niche focus. However, the strategic position has to be defeated 
over time since it is dynamic and fast changing.  
M&A gives the management a tool to quickly expand business fields or to implement a 
differentiation strategy by acquiring an interestingly positioned competitor. 
2.2.6 The resource theory 
Another approach is the resource theory. Sudarsanam (2010) states that a firm is formed of a 
collection of different resources, which can either be tangible like plants or equipment, or 
intangible like brands and patents and finally of organizational nature like the corporate culture. 
The quality and variety of these resources defines the competitive advantage of a business. 
- 9 - 
Furthermore, also the ability of the corporation to maintain their core capabilities is essential 
for staying competitive in the long run.  
Firms can develop their resources internally and organically, however, in order to close possible 
gaps between their competitors, the M&A path could provide a quick fix in order to acquire the 
resources additionally desired.  
The resource-based view therefore explains the ambition of corporations to create unique 
resource settings, which gives them a strategic advantage, at least in the short run. 
Overview of the different theories explaining M&A activities: 
THEORY MOTIVATION FOR M&A 
Synergy Theory 
 The potential savings in synergies 
justify the premium paid 
 Potential earnings by cross-selling or 
the common use of distribution 
channels can be unlocked 
Transactions cost and Internationalization 
theory 
 Efficient business combinations are 
given if the sum of transaction and 
production costs is lower than in 
market transactions 
Agency theory 
 M&A might be a tool to reduce 
information asymmetries and agency 
costs 
Resources dependency theory 
 A business combination can secure 
the long-term survival by 
guaranteeing the inflow of critical 
resources 
Market theory 
 M&A allow a quick access to new 
markets or to regulated markets 
 M&A provide the possibility to 
acquire or merge with other 
companies in order to implement a 
differentiation strategy 
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 Horizontal merger can help to apply 
cost leadership by providing 
potential economies of scale 
Resource theory 
 M&A might allow access to crucial 
resources with limited availability 
 M&A give the acquiring company 
access to valuable expertise 
 M&A provide the possibility to 
transfer complementary resources in 
order to use them more efficiently 
 
2.3 M&A in practice 
Having considered the most important theoretical theories underlying M&A activities, the focus 
should now shift to why M&As exist in practice and why they tend to appear in waves. There 
are more than just theoretical concepts that describe the tendency of managers to prefer external 
growth over internal growth. Interestingly, experts instinctively think about the motives of 
managers to run M&A transactions, while the motives of stakeholder groups are only barely or 
not at all mentioned. Gerpott (1993) explains this phenomenon on the basis of the fact that the 
decision to conclude M&As depends majorly on the management team of the buying company 
and the shareholders of the target company.  
It is generally agreed, that a single motive cannot explain merger activities most of the time. 
Instead, a complex matrix of different motivations is considered to be the make-up of any 
M&A. 
2.3.1 Managerial Motivations for M&A activities 
The reasons why M&A occur in real life are numerous and the motivations for it vary over 
time. The original idea of M&A was definitely supported by the operational synergies of two 
merging companies. Johnson and Scholes (2008) subdivided the motivations for mergers and 
acquisitions into four different categories.  
1. Economic motives 
2. Strategic motives 
3. Financial motives 
4. Managerial motives 
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Economic motives 
Despite many different motives, the category of economic motives forms undoubtingly the most 
influential for managers. The fundamental idea behind it is that competition on the free market 
is based majorly on costs, prices and perceived benefits. According to those principles, M&A 
is exclusively driven by the desire to produce more efficiency and therefore more cost 
effectiveness. 
1) Economies of scale and scope 
Still the most straightforward reasons for M&A activities are the economies of scale and 
scope. In fact, a company almost always is able to reduce its per unit cost by increasing the 
scale of the production after a successful implementation of the target company. The 
production may have a fixed component of costs, like administrative costs, and thus the per 
unit share can be diminished by increasing the total amount produced.  
The economies of scope, instead, describe the cost advantages multi-product firms have. 
Selling several different products in one single multi-product firm can lead to significant 
cost savings compared to individual firms selling those products. The most-known 
examples are the common usage of the R&D department or the advantages one single 
umbrella brand may provide. 
2) Transaction costs and vertical merger 
The relationship between a producer and its supplier, i.e. the vertical component, creates a 
substantial amount of transaction costs. In the case of a market relationship, costs emerge 
from contracting, monitoring and enforcing contractual agreements in cases of non-
compliance.  
The alternative is to internalize such transactions by incorporating the supplier, either 
through its acquisition or the conclusion of a merger. The vertical integration eliminates 
transaction costs and allows an effective allocation of resources like capital or labor. The 
desire to internalize more and more, derives from the information asymmetry in the 
markets. 
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Strategic motives 
Strategic motivations for merger tend to be the second most important reason to justify the 
majority of the transactions. Understanding the strategic position of the company is key for 
every manager in order to take the right decision and to determine the appropriate growth plan.  
Proactive strategic thinking could help the cooperation to predict future trends and to improve 
its strategic position by acquiring/selling businesses. The usage of M&As can accelerate growth 
in specific key segments. 
The activities linked with the process of strategic thinking are for Zotti (2016) the following:  
- Definition of its own business segments 
- Identification of key competencies  
- Analysis of market dynamics 
- Cost comparison acquisition versus organic growth 
Several well-known tools can help diagnose strategic capabilities. Johnson and Scholes (2008) 
named the value chain analysis, the value network analysis, activity maps, benchmark analysis, 
and the SWOT analysis as the most important to consider.  
Practically, the reasons for M&A activities from a strategic point of view could be the 
following: 
1) Diversification 
The analysis of the current position of a company and its business fields with the tools 
already considered could lead managers to undertake M&A activities in order to diversify 
rapidly and to position the firm in higher-growth and higher-margin products or markets. 
The diversification smoothens the income stream of the enterprise and leads to a less 
vulnerable position. The decision of the management team either to diversify internally or 
to acquire the necessary profile company is often influenced by the time and market 
pressure. Therefore, managers tend to prefer M&A in order to react quickly, even accepting 
higher premiums. 
2) Strategic Realignment 
A second motivation for managers, always within the strategic motives, is the strategic 
realignment, which typically is the acquisition of capabilities or know-how in order to 
adopt to environmental or political changes more rapidly in comparison with internal 
structural changes. The trigger for such operations can be technological revolutions like 
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the recent electric car wave in the automotive sector or regulatory/political changes like 
pollution norms or industrial standard settings. However, also the contrary example of 
deregulation could cause M&A waves by lowering the market entry barriers for new 
players. Especially the healthcare, telecommunication, media and defense industry have 
been subject to significant deregulation laws recently. 
3) Market power 
Lastly, management boards appreciate the idea of boosting the market power of their 
company through an increase of selling prices of their products. A highly concentrated 
industry, after horizontal merger waves, typically leads to higher consumer prices. Despite 
that basic logic, it has to be said that most of the M&A transactions have to be approved 
by the local cartel bureau whose main goal lies in the conservation of a competitive market, 
which is to say the prevention of de-facto monopolistic industries. The market power 
theorem might be more applicable in strongly regulated environments like the 
pharmaceutical or energy industries. 
Financial motives  
The second largest reason for managers to push for M&As, lies in ability of such operations to 
lead to a financial betterment of the company. Obviously, all of the motives have a financial 
background and need to generate rates of return that are satisfactory to justify the merger or 
acquisition. However, there are nevertheless some motives whose rationale rests exclusively on 
the financial benefits M&As can yield for the company. 
Cost of Capital 
The highest saving potential lays in the reduced cost of capital (WACC) of the combined 
companies in comparison with the standalone costs. The reduced WACC have different 
motivations:  
a) By acquiring/or merging with a company and an uncorrelated business, a 
diversification, and therefore a reduction, of the systemic risks can be obtained. The 
smoothening of the income and profit streams reduces the risk of insolvency in general. 
These usually correspond to a lower cost of capital.  
b) Larger companies have an easier access to capital markets and more alternative ways 
to raise capital. More possibilities often correspond with a lower cost. Furthermore, 
Weston and Chung (1997) state that the increased debt capacity, in particular, allows 
the company to save capital costs.  
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Tax Savings 
Taxation motives represent the second most important category within the financial motives. 
Tax savings may also result from the tax loss carried forward by the target company. Those can 
be used to diminish future tax payments of the acquirer which themselves can potentially lead 
to an improved cash flow statement. Current losses of a target company could also partially 
justify its acquisition, as it would allow the acquiring company to offset huge tax payments. 
Managerial motives  
Even though we touched several financial and strategic reasons underlying the pursuit of M&A 
operations, a third and mostly unknown category of motives should be added to the list. 
Interestingly, these motives are not solely linked to economic considerations.  
Empire-Building Theory 
Trautwein (1990) described an interesting concept in his study. The empire-building theory 
states that managers try to maximize their own utility when deciding to conclude mergers or 
executing such transaction. The basic idea is that the management board follows different 
interests that do not always align with the interests of the majority shareholders. The underlying 
problem is the compensation of top managers: in fact, a manager’s remuneration is often 
correlated with the company’s size. However, other studies added non-monetary reasons to the 
empire-building theory. Some authors named the “increasing prestige” as the main factor; 
others just called it “ego”. However, it is generally agreed that social prestige is correlated with 
the actual size of the business.  
Hubris (Managerial Pride) 
Overconfidence plays an important role in the evaluation process of a possible target. According 
to the so-called evaluation theory, the M&A activities are planned with an overestimation of 
values in comparison to the market valuation. The board of the acquiring company often 
believes that it alone is capable of assessing the possible synergies and benefits that can derive 
from a merger. A second scenario describes the fact when managers think they have found an 
undervalued company that might be sold at a higher price. The excessive optimism of acquirers 
often leads to overvaluations of the target firm. As a result, the acquirer is likely to overpay. 
2.3.2 Managerial Motives – a STUDY 
Mukherjee, Kiymaz and Baker (2004) analyzed in an interesting study the most important 
reasons for M&A. The respondents, CEO or responsible people for M&As, were asked to rank 
their motives.  
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Table 1 - Source Mukherjee, Kiymaz & Baker 
The exhibit ranks the motivations given by the managers. The result is that synergy, 
diversification and/or restructuring motivations accounted for about 80% of the total answers 
given. Even if the survey was performed in the 90ies, recent studies have further confirmed this 
ranking.  
Mukherjee, Kiymaz and Baker also asked the participants to name the top sources of synergies 
to managers whose companies had recently been involved in synergy-related mergers. 
 
Table 2 - Source Mukherjee, Kiymaz & Baker 
The outcome was that operation economies accounted for approximately 90% of the total 
answers. Market power effects and financial benefits proved to be mostly insignificant. The 
study confirmed the general assumption that M&A activities are mainly justified by operational 
synergies and potential reductions in productivity and cost cuts. 
2.3.3 The M&A Process 
Generally, the public notices M&A transactions only when the conclusion of a significant deal 
is mentioned in the news or television. The signing of an M&A is definitely an important step 
as it finalizes the pre-transaction activities. However, M&A has to be seen as a complex process 
over time, where the contract signing is only a small fraction.  
The different steps are numerous, Bausch (2003), however, named four different processes 
which can be divided into three major phases: 
1) Pre-Transaction Phase 
2) Transaction Phase 
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3) Post-Transaction Phase 
Pre-Transaction Phase 
The process of a possible merger or acquisition made by an acquirer starts with a strategic 
analysis of its position on the market. Porter’s five forces model often provides a solid base in 
understanding the environment in which the company is placed. Secondly, a general SWOT 
analysis provides useful information regarding future opportunities and threats the firm may 
face. The management board has then to decide how they would like to guarantee the 
company’s future competitiveness. Such operations require nimble and creative decision-
making.  
The board also has to name and specify possible synergies and, in that respect, consider the 
convenience of future M&A transactions. Essential in this regard, is the development of a 
common strategy plan for the entire business combination. DePamphilis (2014) notes that 
according to many successful acquires, M&As were not seen as a business strategy but rather 
as a means of implementing a business strategy.  
Acquisitions may accelerate the firm’s growth, however it is questionable if the growth remains 
sustainable. These decisions are often at the whim of the acquirer’s vision of what the company 
should be as well as the specific implementation strategy he wishes to adopt.  
The business plan quantifies the mission and strategy and materializes the words. The decision 
whether a business combination makes sense or not, remains a top-level management task.  
To ensure that a possible acquisition is managed in a proper way, the senior management has 
to provide guidance for the M&A team as well as a timetable that recognizes all key events in 
the acquisition process.  
Before starting the screening process for possible candidates, the M&A team has to be provided 
with the determining criteria e.g. growth rate, location, kind of business model.  
The acquisition or merger process starts with the application of screening profiles to identify 
possible candidates and preliminary confidential interviews to fully understand the business 
model of the target company. Moreover, it is important to gather as much information as 
possible to find a candidate that represents the best strategic or financial fit. An intense 
preliminary analysis can avoid information overload.  
After the scouting and screening of prospective targets, confidentiality agreements are signed 
with the best candidates. Their goal is to ensure confidentiality while the M&A team works 
through the legal and financial documents provided in the so called “data room”, which is a 
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physical or virtual room that holds important documents needed in order to understand the 
strengths and weaknesses of a company as well as the potential risks of a possible deal. 
Transaction Phase 
The second stage consists of formulating a potential purchase or merging scenario, which is 
satisfactory for both sides. Bausch (2003) subdivides the transaction phase in to sub-processes, 
the negotiation and the planning process. The latter consists of the fundamental decisions about 
the design of the possible business combination.  
Planning process 
The M&A teams try to concretize potential synergies and savings and break them down to 
numbers in order to value the target company. The planning contains also activities that 
anticipate future tasks and the conditions in the business combination. Pre-closing planning can 
further help to facilitate the integration process after a possible conclusion of the deal. It might 
accelerate the entire process, because a clear idea of the future role of the target exists and goals 
and time limits were already set. 
The valuation is definitely the most critical part of the entire M&A process. The acquiring 
companies want to avoid overpayments that may destroy shareholder value.  
Values and prices obtained by similar transactions can provide a first glimpse at the possible 
range of prices. However, the price paid might be composed of very different numbers. 
DePamphilis (2014) names the current-year earnings’ multiple as an applicable measurement 
of the value. The current year’s earnings are multiplied with a previously agreed-on price-to-
earnings multiplier. Nevertheless, the evaluation may be conducted in a different way. A second 
scenario could be that the purchase price consists of the standalone value of the target to which 
is then added a certain premium paid by the acquirer in order to compensate the shareholder, 
based on the calculation of possible synergies and cost savings. The standalone value often 
corresponds with the enterprise value (EV) minus the net debt of the target company.  
Preliminary legal transaction documents also include the term sheets, which outline the primary 
areas of agreement and, at the same time, act as a basis for further negotiations. Those 
documents consist of a purchase price range, the description of the assets/shares willing to buy, 
limitations on the use of data and no-shop provisions in order to avoid sharing the proposals 
with other parties.  
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Negotiation process 
The last stage in the transaction phase consists of working closely with all the different advisors 
in order to be able to provide a solid purchasing offer. The offer includes all details about the 
transaction itself, the ownership transaction, the price paid, and information on the specifics of 
the closing of the deal, such as the payment method, i.e. payment in cash, shares or a 
combination of both of them. Successful negotiations are characterized by the fact that both 
sides search jointly for a solution.  
The negotiation process consists also of creating a financing plan, which is often necessary to 
understand the maximum amount a buyer can offer. Furthermore, financing plans are used for 
negotiations with external capital lenders in cases where the financing is not exclusively made 
up by own reserves.  
In addition to that, the acquiring company has to decide whether it is going to pay only by cash, 
by a combination of cash and shares or only by shares. The total consideration may be 
contingent on future performance and therefore, a portion of the purchasing price might be put 
in escrow for the fulfillment in the future.  
The negotiation process ends with the signing of a contract that is the product of what the parties 
agreed on in the bargaining phase.  
Post-Transaction Phase 
The success of an M&A transaction is not defined by the signing of the agreement but rather 
by its efficacious implementation. Actually, the post-transaction phase forms the most 
important part of the whole M&A operation. The integration of the acquired company and the 
realization of the value adding activities are essential to call a transaction successful. Bierich 
(1988) defines success as the degree to which the set goals have been achieved, whereas the 
goal is defined as a planned position.  
The post-merger success depends primarily on the awareness of the integration challenges and 
the degree to which those challenges have been addressed properly. Whitaker (2013) names 
potential pitfalls in his journal, including the following: 
 Excessive focus on closing the deal instead of making the deal working 
 Lack of focus on operational, cultural, strategic and organizational assessment 
 Missing tracking system for synergies 
 Overreliance on processes and avoidance of critical issues such as culture and politics. 
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Rührig (2009) worked on the integration problems after international mergers and concluded 
that the following motives can lead to substantial problems after an M&A operation: 
1. Differing organizational structures 
2. Misfit of organizational cultures 
3. Lack of leadership skill at the top-level management 
4. Personal resistance 
5. Incompatibility of IT systems or distribution structures 
6. Financial or legal problems   
Integrational problems obviously create costs or diminish the potential synergy effects. Jansen 
(2003), however, provided a model to address the most influential and most critical motives for 
a successful integration. According to him and his 7K model, companies should be aware of 
the following core problems and provide plans before the integration process starts: 
1. culture [ cultural profiles can help to overcome with problems ] 
2. communication, [ clear communication plans for staff, clients and supplier ] 
3. clients and partners [ awareness of existing clients/partners and special treatment ] 
4. know-how [ plans to avoid know-how outflow by layoffs ] 
5. labor [ training plans and workshop inform staff about new career prospects ] 
6. controlling [ effective control measurement displays the success or failure ] 
7. coordination [ task forces can accelerate a successful integration ] 
Management teams should be aware of the potential pitfalls. A well-structured and 
sophisticated post-merger integration plan can help to overcome with most of the integration 
hurdles. It is important to focus intensively on the post-merger plan and its implementation. 
2.3.4 Defining and measuring success of a M&A transaction 
It is essential to define success of an M&A transaction. Generally, success equates to higher 
profits. Sometimes, the share price and market capitalization also play a significant role in the 
determination of success.  
According to the finance perspective, shareholders are better off, if their shares gained value 
because of the acquisition. Susarsanam (2010) defines “better off” as the term that defines when 
the rate of return of the shareholders is at least equal to the cost of capital.  
March and Simon (1958) criticized the sole focus on profitability. They suggest concentrating 
also on the stakeholders, such as creditors, suppliers, personnel, clients and local communities. 
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If the total satisfactory level beats the previous situation of the separated entities, the M&A can 
be considered a success.  
Unfortunately, the interests of different stakeholders are often contradictory. The simultaneous 
fulfillment of all those different interests is hardly ever possible. In addition to that, an objective 
measurement of the degree of success is impossible.  
Another fundamental issue in determining the success of a merger lies in the fact that, once a 
merger is conducted, it becomes nearly impossible to compare it to the performance these firms 
might have showed, had they been kept separate entities. A legitimate solution to overcome 
these issues is to take into consideration the pre-merger forecast for each of the companies and 
compare them with the actual post-merger or acquisition performance.  
Jiang and Lin (2011) tried to apply an empirical perspective and analyzed the synergy effect 
and the actual performance post-merger of several international M&A transactions from 2004-
2006. The econometric model included performance indicators, which were formed by selected 
ratios, as well as performance forecasts of firms that ended up not entering a merger deal. The 
outcome was that M&A produces positive synergy effects especially in the short run. However, 
the assumption of overall positive effects did not hold in the long run.  
3.  The Daimler-Chrysler case 
3.1 The history of the two automotive colossuses 
Daimler-Benz 
In the late 80ies, the former extremely successful German luxury brand Mercedes-Benz was 
facing new and strong competitors. Especially the new luxury line Lexus of the Japanese giant 
Toyota was a serious threat to Mercedes-Benz’s large market share at the time. The German 
company pursued a new strategy of cost reduction and an intense customer relationship. Success 
was not long in coming: in the course of a few years Daimler-Benz, the holding company of 
the Mercedes brand, hit new sales records.  
Nevertheless, the car production of Daimler was twice as labor intensive as the production line 
of Lexus. In addition to that, the market share in the U.S. fluctuated around 1% (Standard & 
Poors Stock Reports, 1997). By finding an equal and committed partner, Mercedes-Benz hoped 
to cut the production costs as a result of significant economies of scale.  
In order to better understand the corporate changes and roots of the organizational and cultural 
structures of the company, it is necessary to spend some time on the history of the well-known 
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corporation. The Daimler-Benz Aktiengesellschaft (AG) was one of the first players in the 
automobile industry and was founded in 1899. The founders Karl Benz and Gottlieb Daimler 
formed the young corporation into the world’s largest automotive manufacturer in 1910. 
After the horrors of World War I and the destruction of most of the company’s buildings, 
shareholders agreed that the only way to survive war to merge with “Daimler-Motoren 
Gesellschaft” (DMG), one of the largest competitors in Germany. The company’s most popular 
brand, i.e. Mercedes actually derived its name from the Mercedes model series of DMG.  
During the great depression, the company suffered huge losses and was close to bankruptcy. 
However, the years of crisis encouraged the unity and hushed the separatist within the 
cooperation.  
The car enthusiasm of the head of the Third Reich brought the automotive firm back to 
profitable roads. Thanks to a series of promotions, tax breaks and the outlook of a massive 
highway-building program by Hitler, the company ran at full capacity.   
However, with the start of the war, private car sales were banned and petrol was rationed. Not 
surprisingly, Daimler-Benz was becoming an important supplier of military equipment and had 
to stop the automotive production by 1944. 
The post-war era was challenging, given that more than 50% of the plants were destroyed by 
ally bombs. A loan from several German banks and the Unimog model saved the company from 
bankruptcy. The economic boom in the 50ies boosted the growth and soon Daimler-Benz 
regained its title as the largest automobile producer in Europe.  
At the end of the 60ies and during the early 70ies, Daimler-Benz pushed for further 
internationalization and was on the way to become a worldwide empire. Finally, in 1973 the 
foreign sales overtook the domestic numbers.  
Interestingly enough, the oil crises of the 70ies had little impact on the performance of the 
German enterprise. Firstly, Daimler-Benz was growing at moderate rates, but steadily and 
relatively unaffected by ups and down in the economy. Secondly, they were able to respond 
properly to the aforementioned crises: the invention of the diesel oil powered 240 D, was tailor-
made for the 70ies and its oil crises, since there had not been any restrictions on diesel.  
During the 80ies, the company tried to expand further and diversify its businesses. Through a 
series of acquisitions such as the MTU or the Dornier-Werke, the enterprise gained additional 
self-confidence. 
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Jürgen E. Schrempp, later destined to become CEO of the group, was elected as chairman of 
the board of management of the DASA (Deutsche Aerospace AG) in 1989, a subsidiary of 
Daimler-Benz.  
The early 90ies were characterized by the reunion of Germany. In addition to the new unknown 
political challenges, Daimler-Benz was facing significant problems by the end of 1993. Several 
diversification acquisitions had turned to loss bringers. Furthermore, 1993 brought the first loss 
in the company’s income statement. However, it has to be said that the loss appeared 
exclusively under US GAAP, whereas under German accounting standards, the enterprise was 
still profitable.  
The company announced drastic counter measurements in order to respond to the loss. Plants 
were closed, payrolls cut, and the core competences were strengthened. (Daimler-Benz, 1994, 
1995) 
In addition to that, Daimler-Benz started a lay-off wave and reduced its personnel only in 
Germany by 80,000 employees until 1996 (Daimler-Benz, 1998, p. 88). 
In 1995, Daimler-Benz would account for another record loss, which led to the election of a 
new chairman, namely Jürgen E. Schrempp, who in May 1995 took on the task of bringing the 
company back to its former glory. 
He had the vision of a new streamlined Daimler-Benz conglomerate and pursed it in an 
incredible manner. Under his coordination, many participations were spun off and costs were 
reduced. The power was concentrated at the Daimler headquarter in Möhringen. His plan 
consisted also of an incorporation of the profitable Mercedes department. 
Following a confrontation with Schrempp, on January 16, 1997, Werner, chairman of 
Mercedes, and soon after Mercedes merged with Daimler-Benz into Daimler with its CEO 
Schrempp at the top. 
Chrysler Corporation 
Meanwhile, the Chrysler Corporation led the ranking of world’s most profitable car producer. 
Especially their light trucks, vans, and large sedans fired the sales in the mid 90ies. The risk 
they took to keep old-fashioned and American spirit influenced in their portfolio when imports 
of Japanese and European cars rocketed paid off. The U.S. market share reached an all-time 
high of 23% in 1997 (Finkelstein, 2002). Interestingly, their product development costs were 
about less than 50% compared to Ford or GM.  
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Chrysler, the underdog among the three automotive giants in the U.S., had managed to become 
the third largest car producer after a deep crisis and quasi bankruptcy after World War II. With 
highly demanded models and high liquidity, it was generally agreed that the time was right for 
a takeover or fusion.  
Chrysler Corporation’s CEO Bob Eaton warned the shareholders, despite breath-taking profits 
and growth rates, of the dark future, filled with overcapacity scenarios, environmental concerns, 
and a retail revolution.  
He described the prospective challenges with the perfect storm and said: “Don’t go there. Be 
somewhere else, and don’t do it alone.” (Vlasic, Bill, & Stertz, 2001) He tried to align the 
shareholders to a probable merger with Daimler-Benz.  
3.2 “The marriage under equals” 
On May 7, 1998, Daimler-Benz chairman Jürgen Schrempp and Chrysler Boss Robert Eaton 
proudly announced the conclusion of negotiation and the official merger of the two automotive 
giants. Through the newly founded entity named DaimlerChrysler (DCX) the share-for-share 
exchange took place. This 37 billion Dollar stock-swap deal was considered as the largest 
transatlantic merger ever.  
3.2.1 Motivations for the merger 
Back in 1996, Daimler-Benz AG was still the largest industrial group in Germany with sales 
about roughly 70 billion dollar. Schrempp and its new policy of streamlining the group was 
successful and the company turned profitable after the greatest consolidated loss in 1995 in 
history. (Daimler-Benz, 1996, 1997) 
The decision to concentrate on the automotive branch of the Daimler-Benz group was the 
handwriting of its radical chairman Schrempp. In 1993, Daimler-Benz consisted of several 
different divisions such as the DASA (aircraft, space, and defense), the transportation division 
(rail systems), the AEG (engines, turbines, cables, microelectronics), and the debis (IT-services, 
financial services, insurances, marketing services). (Daimler-Benz, 1994) 
However, the passenger cars and commercial vehicles continued to be the driver for growth and 
brought the majority of operating profits. In addition to that, by analyzing the loss in 1995, 
which derived from the DASA division, it further confirmed that the path Schrempp proposed 
was probably the only way out of the crisis. The major achievements were the spin offs of 
Energy Systems and the Automation Division and the dismantling of AEG.  
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The automotive division of Daimler-Benz was mainly basing on the success of its Mercedes 
brand that was and still is a premium brand with limited demand. Back in 1997, the premium 
sector made up only twelve percent of the total market. Therefore, it appeared to be obvious 
that a significant expansion of the group had to be accomplished by a stronger focus on the 
mass-market.  
Mercedes already launched the Smart and the A-Class in 1994 and showed commitment to enter 
in the small and micro-compact car segment, however, those cars were still excessively 
expensive for the emerging countries.  
With these facts in mind, Schrempp told a team of people to analyze the mass-market producer 
and scan them for potential synergies. Important were the following constraints: the potential 
partner must provide profitable growth, its markets should not overlap and the partnership had 
to be balanced, because Daimler was not looking for a partnership, wherein it would become 
the junior member.   
It was soon clear that General Motors and Ford were far too large for a potential partnership. 
Chrysler, instead, had 61 billion dollars in net sales in 1996, which was almost double the result 
of 1992. Their pretax earnings were around $6 billion. This tremendous success based on a 
record sale of 3 million vehicles in 1996. The lightweight trucks and minivans accounted for 
two third of the total sales. The strength of Chrysler came from a cost effective production, 
using an intelligent platform strategy that kept costs low. However, Chrysler CEO Eaton 
thought that Chrysler was not competitive enough in order to survive the challenges ahead. He 
was also out looking for a strong partner in Europe and in the emerging countries, where 
Chrysler did not exist.  
On January 12, 1998, Schrempp for the first time discussed a possible fusion with chairman 
Eaton during the Detroit Auto Show. (Blas̆ko, Netter, & Sinkey, 2000) 
During the evaluation process of both sides, it appeared that according to the facts both 
candidates were ideal partners. Chrysler generated most of the sales in America and with low-
price majorly lightweight trucks, whereas Daimler-Benz was focusing on Europe and emerging 
market and sold premium passenger cars. Therefore, they could complement each other. Eaton 
said that “both companies have product ranges with world class brand that complement each 
other perfectly (“Merger Agreement Signed: Daimler-Benz and Chrysler Combine to Form the 
Leading Global Automotive Company,” 1998) 
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Business analysts were also quite optimistic about the possible merger. According to them, the 
geographical compatibility, their complementarity, and the synergy of skills were the major 
motivations for the merger.  
The expected benefits should come from decreased purchase prices for raw material and 
services and the consequent usage of the distribution chains of the relative partner. 
The optimization of complementary products and the benefits in product development were 
also key for a successful and profitable partnership. In the first consolidated annual report of 
1998, Schrempp and Eaton named six important fields which they combined after the merger 
in order to realize the synergy target of 1.4 billion dollar (DaimlerChrysler, 1999): 
1. Procurement functions – leveraging the combined purchasing power of $94 billion 
2. The sales and marketing organizations 
3. Executive management development 
4. Research and development teams 
5. Financial services business 
6. IT, legal, communications, quality assurance, corporate finance departments 
Both CEOs expressed their commitment of pursuing a fast and efficient integration process.  
3.2.2 The timeline 
The table below describes the precise timeline, starting from the very first discussions between 
the CEOs of Daimler and Chrysler and ending with the listing of the newly founded entity 
DaimlerChrysler. 
January 12, 1998 Schrempp discusses a possible merger with Eaton during the 
Detroit Motor Show 
February 12–18, 1998  Start of discussions within groups of representatives and advisors 
 
March 2, 1998 
 
Meeting of Eaton and Schrempp to plan governance and 
organizational structures 
March–April, 1998 Teams prepare possible business combinations 
April 23–May 6, 1998 Business combination agreement is negotiated  
May 6, 1998 Merger agreement signing in London 
May 7, 1998 Merger announcement  
- 26 - 
May 14, 1998 Daimler-Benz Supervisory Board agrees to merger 
June 18, 1998 Daimler-Benz management team visits Auburn Hills 
June 25, 1998 Chrysler management team visits Stuttgart 
July 23, 1998 European Commission approves merger 
July 31, 1998 Federal Trade Commission approves merger 
August 6, 1998 Announcement that DaimlerChrysler shares will trade as “global 
stock” rather than American Depositary Receipts (ADRs). 
August 6, 1998 Daimler-Benz and Chrysler mail Proxy Statement/Prospectus to 
shareholders 
August 27, 1998 Daimler-Benz and Chrysler management teams meet in 
Greenbrier, West Virginia to discuss post-merger plans 
September 18, 1998 Chrysler shareholders approve merger with 97.5% approval. 
September 18, 1998 Daimler-Benz shareholders approve merger with 99.9% 
approval. 
November 6, 1998 Chrysler issues 23.5 million shares to corporate pension plan to 
qualify for pooling-of-interests accounting treatment. 
November 9, 1998 Daimler-Benz receives 98% of stock in exchange offer 
November 12, 1998 DaimlerChrysler merger transaction closes. 
November 17, 1998 Day One: DaimlerChrysler stock begins trading on stock 
exchanges worldwide under symbol DCX 
Table 3- Timeline Source: DaimlerChrysler Prospectus (DaimlerChrysler, 1998) 
The merger was concluded nearly within 10 months, which is, considering the sizes of both 
companies, quite respectable. Both CEOs were so committed and convinced that the path of a 
fusion would be the only way to survive and therefore time mattered.  
The management was proud to announce the so-called “merger of equals”. In the assessment 
phase, it appeared that both companies were quite comparable and therefore the name “merger 
of equals” was born.  
3.2.3 Details of the deal 
Both companies agreed on a stock swap merger. There are different valuation techniques using 
book or market values or even expected earnings. A common approach is to apply the market 
values of both firms over a certain time in order to exclude variations due to merger rumors. 
The exchange rate ratio was computed using the average market price of both companies during 
1998. (DaimlerChrysler, 1998) 
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Goldman Sachs and CSFB were asked to assist the M&A teams in both companies with the 
valuation and financial analysis. Several different methods were applied  
Both advisors expressed fairness opinions in order to facilitate the decision in the boards about 
the approval of the exchange ratio.  
Interestingly, the proposed exchange ratio and hence the Chrysler’s share of 41.4% 
corresponded with a premium ranging from 15% - 37%. The table below, which analyzed the 
fair share of Daimler and Chrysler of Daimler-Chrysler, indicates the different shares by 
applying different valuation techniques.  
Applied Method Share of Daimler-Chrysler 
 For Daimler For Chrysler 
Market Values 68.4% 31.6% 
Actual Exchange Ratio 55.6% 44.4% 
Total Revenues 52.9% 47.1% 
Net Assets 56.1% 43.9% 
Net Income 46.7% 53.3% 
Table 4 - Source: DaimlerChrysler Prospectus 
The actual ratios were 1:1.005 for Daimler-Benz’s shareholders and 1:062.35 for Chrysler’ 
shareholders. Chrysler was therefore given a premium over the closing prices of about 31%. 
(Blas̆ko et al., 2000) The deal was favorable for Chrysler’s shareholders when applying the 
market values.  
From a legal point of view, a real merger between the two companies never happened. The 
direct merger of Chrysler into Daimler would have the consequence of a costly transfer of 
assets not involved into a new U.S. subsidiary. Therefore, the original Chrysler Corporation 
was kept but the ownership was transferred to the newly founded DaimlerChrysler AG. 
(Blas̆ko et al., 2000) 
3.2.4 The post-merger restructuring  
The first reaction, especially on the stock market, was mainly positive. The abnormal return 
after the announcement was 30.9% for Chrysler and 4.6% for Daimler shareholder respectively. 
The newly founded entity Daimler-Chrysler had a market capitalization around $95 billion, 
which corresponded with a $10 billion plus in respect with the combined market capitalizations 
of both firm pre-merger. On November 18, 1998, the DaimlerChrysler shares were for the first 
time traded on the stock exchanges.  
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The new conglomerate employed more than 400,000 people and was keen to realize substantial 
savings in sales, raw materials, distribution channels, or R&D due to economies of scale and 
scope. 
The merger brought DaimlerChrysler on the fifth position of world’s largest automotive 
producer and they became third largest in sales. (Kavanagh, 2008) 
Eaton and Schrempp, the two chairmen of the new enterprise, were responsible of 
amalgamating the two cultural very differing companies. Both believed that the potential 
synergies and benefits from jointly developing new products and sharing expertise were huge.  
The post-merger structure consisted of five different departments, namely the Mercedes 
division, the Chrysler division, commercial vehicles, financial services, and the aerospace 
branch. Interestingly, Chrysler appeared to be the fifth business unit of the already existing 
fields of Daimler-Benz. Somehow, it showed already that the merger of equals was never 
thought to be a real merger.  
The merger plan forecasted annual savings of 1.499 million $ in the year after the merger and 
3.000 million $ within the range of 3-5 years (Vedele, 2013). However, the actual numbers 
differed significantly. The management overestimated the abilities to create value from the 
merger. The reasons why the merger failed were numerous and are about to be explained below. 
3.3. The failure of DaimlerChrysler 
3.3.1 Operational problems 
The post-merger performance, especially of Chrysler, has been bad. In the first full year of 
partnership, the result was positive and the group closed with earnings of around € 10.3 billion. 
Chrysler realized an operating profit of € 5 billion, whereas Mercedes contributed € 2.7 billion, 
and the missing part came from the branches commercial vehicles, services, and aerospace. 
(DaimlerChrysler, 2000) 
The share price reached a new maximum of 108$ per share in January 1999. From then on, the 
steady and continuous decline began.  
In 2000, the performance of Chrysler drastically dropped to profits of € 501 million, in respect 
to €5 billion in 1999 a huge break-in. (Vedele, 2013) Mercedes, as proven over many years, 
delivered stable margins. DaimlerChrysler itself named the intense competition, higher 
marketing, and start-up cost as well as increased refinancing costs as main reason for the fallen 
profits.  
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Chairman Eaton announced his retirement in January 2000. Eaton was also somehow 
disappointed and saw his position in the enterprise only transitional. The management style was 
definitely characterized by the authoritarian style of Schrempp. He further underlined his view 
of the merger when he gave an interview to the Financial Times and stated that the “marriage 
of equals” was intentionally created to overcome with psychological hurdles, but in reality, he 
had always planned to acquire Chrysler. (Nesshöfer & Herz, 2007) 
Schrempp took advantage of Eaton’s retirement and installed his German colleague Zetsche in 
Auburn Hills, the headquarter of Chrysler. Zetsche’s mission was to restructure and reorganize 
Chrysler in order to become more profitable again. DaimlerChrysler already knew that the 
process would be costly and not doable without significant layoffs.  
Surprisingly, Zetsche became generally accepted and appreciated at the US base. In 2001, 
Zetsche had to present his turnaround plan in order to restructure Chrysler. More than 26,000 
employees were about to be fired and six US plants were planned to close during the following 
years. (Nesshöfer & Herz, 2007) 
In February 2002, Chrysler boss Zetsche announced a record loss of €5.3 billion for 2001. For 
the DaimlerChrysler group it meant to record a loss of € 662 million. (DaimlerChrysler, 2002) 
The Mitsubishi deal 
Schrempp had his own vision of the DaimlerChrysler enterprise. He wanted to build the so-
called “Welt AG”, a conglomerate of automotive firms, operating all over the world and with 
products ranging from the micro car until the luxury sedan. The merger with Chrysler was only 
the first step of a series of acquisitions and partnerships. Soon after the Chrysler deal was closed, 
Schrempp looked-out for a strategic partner in Asia. Daimler’s board had expressed serious 
expansion goals for Asia already back in the mid-1990s. However, it was recognized that 
Daimler needed a partner as Ford did with Mazda and GM with Isuzu in order to achieve the 
ambitious growth goals.  
DaimlerChrysler identified first Mitsubishi as the ideal partner that gave access to the Asian 
markets. In addition to that, DaimlerChrysler discovered also substantial growth possibilities 
for Mitsubishi in Europe and the US.  
Already Schrempp’s predecessor Reuter had negotiated with the Asians about forging alliances. 
However, the plan to further expand the conglomerate became then reality in 2000. Mitsubishi, 
which suffered from huge losses and debt and which announced a costly turnover plan, 
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appreciated the interest of the German/American automotive giant and encouraged them to buy 
34% of its shares in May 2000. (Begley & Donnelly, 2011) 
Schrempp was criticized for undertaking unnecessary risks with the acquisition of the 
Mitsubishi stake, the problem he had with the Chrysler were already expensive and hardly 
foreseeable. Officially, the acquisition was financed by the 50.1% stake sale of Debis. The 
acquisition of a 10% participation in Hyundai, Mitsubishi’s Korean partner, was then the final 
touch.  
Keeping in mind that the integration of Chrysler stood far from completion, the Asian alliances 
brought new challenges for the management team. A million of defective vehicles caused a 
huge recall and a subsequent drop in share price of 30%. 
However, the German management team had to focus on the US-based Chrysler arm and less 
on Mitsubishi’s problems. Nevertheless, the German headquarter created in collaboration with 
the Japanese a restructuring plan in order to handle the crisis. The plan foresaw the exchange 
of parts and sharing platform between Chrysler and Mitsubishi. It also included substantial lay-
offs and estimated that it would cost at least $2.8 billion. (Begley & Donnelly, 2011) 
The critical situation peaked in 2003 when Mitsubishi recorded a loss of more than $ 2 billion, 
also due to a $454 million provision because of default payments investigated in 2000. 
(Mitsubishi Motors Corporation, 2004). Schrempp found himself more and more in trouble. On 
the one hand, Mitsubishi continued to produce losses and the restructuring plan failed to change 
the business model substantially in order to become profitable again; on the other hand, 
Chrysler, after a profitable year in 2002, unfortunately had to report losses again in 2003 and 
announced losses of half a billion dollars. 
In the same year, Bloomberg released a devastating statement regarding the performance of 
DaimlerChrysler in the former five years (Nesshöfer & Herz, 2007). Bloomberg stated that 
Schrempp “destroyed the total value of the former Daimler business” and that “Chrysler would 
only be a dead weight, hanging on the neck of a profitable business”. 
Schrempp acknowledging that Mitsubishi was in need of substantial capital injection, for the 
very first time was compelled to ask the executive board for advice. Chrysler’s chairman 
Zetsche and the vice chairman Bernhard refused to agree with Schrempp. After intense 
negotiations, Schrempp finally announced the disposal of the Mitsubishi participation. In the 
meanwhile, voices that demanded the resignation of Schrempp got louder. Investors were 
furious about the $40 billion loss in market capitalization since the merger with Chrysler. 
Nevertheless, the supervisory board extended Schrempp’s contract until 2008. The chairman 
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was still convinced of his business strategy’s potential to yield successes in the future. 
(Nesshöfer & Herz, 2007) 
3.3.2 Junior status and cultural differences  
The senior management team, which was involved since the beginning of the merger deal, 
stated that no cultural differences had ever existed. Robert Lutz, a former Vice-chairman of 
Chrysler, stated the following: “they look like us, they talk like us, they are focused on the same 
things, and their command of English is impeccable”. (Finkelstein, 2002) 
However, the problem of cultural differences appeared during the post-merger integration. The 
management team was aware of possible clashes and spent millions in cultural sensitivity 
workshops. Nevertheless, the Germans had a hard time breaking out of their preconceived 
notions of quality with regard to Chrysler’s manufacturing standards. Moreover, some members 
of the Daimler’s executive board stated that they would never buy or drive a Chrysler.  
Finkelstein (2002) identified two major problematic fields:  
1) Differentials in pay and travelling 
The differences between the compensation plans in Europe and America have always 
been fundamental. American managers were generally compensated in part in the form 
of stock options, whereas their German counterparts were remunerated on the basis of 
fixed financial performance indicators. Consequently, many highly skilled people left 
Chrysler for Ford or GM, because they knew their salaries would not rise significantly. 
The German perception, as well as the perception in Europe in general, of high salaries 
was mainly negative. A significant equalization was not expectable, given the European 
mindset that looked at huge differences in pay between workers and managers 
unfavorably.  
On the other hand, Chrysler’s management team struggled with the German practice of 
travelling and lodging. Dining in the finest restaurants and spending nights in the most 
expensive Hotels belonged to the German way of managing. Clearly, it would not 
determine the success or failure of an intercontinental merger, however, it is a practical 
example of how different the two management styles were. 
2) Junior Partner 
Marriage under equals: the whole deal started with the statement that the fusion would 
be a merger of comparable firms. However, Schrempp clarified his view of the merger 
soon after the official partnership. In 2000, Schrempp admitted in an interview for the 
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Financial times that while calling the deal a “marriage of equals” went a long way in 
fostering American acceptance of the merger, in reality, he had always viewed their 
arrangement in terms of an “acquisition” (Nesshöfer & Herz, 2007). Chrysler’s staff and 
especially the management expressed outrage over Schrempp’s arrogant statement. The 
proud Americans were convinced of doing it the right way and hated the fact the 
Germans felt superior.  
3.3.3 Mismanagement  
DaimlerChrysler failed to create and apply a detailed post-merger plan. The actions were 
certainly not coordinated perfectly. The simple fact that Chrysler was neither a merger, such as 
Schrempp publicly announced nor a fully accepted acquisition, did not facilitate an effective 
integration. (Finkelstein, 2002) 
The programs put in place to oppose the loss of many highly skilled personnel that had been 
with the company for a long time, was not very effective to say the least. Schrempp was aware 
of issues during the  incorporation process of Chrysler. His plan, therefore, consisted in legally 
unifying both companies, while on the other hand, letting each company run their businesses 
independently as they did in the past, at least from an operational standpoint.  
Consequently, Chrysler was lacking a clear vision and strategy. The appointment of a new 
German management team in 2000 came not early enough in order to prevent Chrysler of losing 
cash.   
Furthermore, the corporate management was literally unable to unlock substantial cost savings, 
mainly due to the bias in brands and the incompatibility of the product ranges of both 
companies. In addition to that, Daimler would not abandon its long-term philosophy of “quality 
at any price”, which was very much in contrast with Chrysler’s way of producing price-targeted 
cars. As a result, eventual sharing of platforms or even components was never discussed 
seriously.   
From this point of view, the merger with Chrysler used to be more of a strategic move for 
Daimler-Benz, which should help to diversify its business fields rather than a real and 
sustainable merger. However, the cultural clashes and the mismanagement in the post-merger 
period destroyed important confidence and brought much instability. Therefore, the downward 
spiral was a logic consequence and the Germans’ reaction probably too late in order to turn the 
merger into a success story.  
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4. Chrysler during the financial crisis 
The meltdown of the financial system in 2008 had severe consequences for the global economy. 
The subsequent recession hit the automotive industry hardly.  
All car manufacturers struggled with the shortfall in demand. Especially, the American system, 
whose car sales were based mainly on leasing contracts and consumer loans, noticed the most 
dramatic crash.  
4.1 Chrysler’s troubles and the acquisition by Cerberus Capital 
After the resignation of Schrempp in 2005, his successor, former Chrysler CEO Dieter Zetsche, 
was facing the challenge of saving Daimlers’ profitability and solving the merger issues with 
Chrysler. Zetsche’s first important act as CEO was putting a restructuring plan for Daimler in 
2006 which included the dismissal of 9000 Mercedes and 6000 Daimler workers (Nesshöfer & 
Herz, 2007). 
Zetsche personally believed that the crisis at Chrysler was solved since it delivered stable 
operating profits in 2004 and 2005. However, the public was shocked when the following year 
Zetsche had to announce that Chrysler would lose more than a billion Euros. (DaimlerChrysler, 
2007) The problems at Chrysler repeated themselves. 
Further layoffs were signalized at the annual shareholder’s meeting in Auburn Hills on February 
14, 2007. More interestingly, Zetsche said in an interview that the headquarter would consider 
all options. (Nesshöfer & Herz, 2007) Immediately after, rumors appeared that a buy-out of 
Chrysler was likely to take place.   
JP Morgan was appointed to examine all possible candidates and to prepare a potential buy-out. 
A team around Slaughter Frank presented three interested candidates, two private equity funds 
Cerberus and Blackstone, as well as the Austrian-Canadian supplier Magna. (Handelsblatt, 
2007) 
In April 2007, Zetsche confirmed in front of the shareholders that first negotiations with the 
potential candidates had taken place. The day after Zetsche’s speech, Kirk Kerkorian’s private 
fund, an investor of Chrysler who sued unsuccessfully against the fusion in the late 90ies, 
announced that they would offer $ 4.5 billion dollars for Chrysler’s shares. The intention to put 
pressure on Daimler failed, when Zetsche declared that other offers that had been put to the 
table were more interesting. 
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Even though the labor unions showed resistance, Chrysler was sold to the private equity fund 
Cerberus for $6 billion. The deal represented a milestone for Cerberus and they were committed 
to restructure the company fundamentally. (Nesshöfer & Herz, 2007) 
4.2 Chrysler’s bailout 
4.2.1 The financial crisis and the consequences for the US automotive industry 
The effects of the US financial crisis, which soon after would take over the entire globe, on the 
automotive industry of the United States were catastrophic. The automakers faced the worst 
losses in the history of their corporations. In the United States, car sales dropped from about 17 
million to 10.6 million in 2009.(OICA, 2016) 
Since Chrysler went private through the acquisition by Cerberus, they did not disclose earnings 
publicly. However, taking into account the dramatic losses of its competitors Ford and GM, 
which had suffered a cumulative loss of $18 billion in 2007 and $71 billion in 2008, it was 
reasonable that Chrysler found itself in a similar situation. (Kruger & Goolsbee, 2015) 
In November 2008, the CEOs of the big three asked the House and Senate of the U.S. for a 
bridge-loan of 25 billion dollars in order to prevent bankruptcy and guarantee wages and 
supplier payments. Congress criticized the competiveness of the U.S. companies and  was 
worried that loans would not be paid back, which in turn could have ruined the legislature’s 
reputation; especially since Government intervention was viewed critically by a majority of the 
American public. Consequently, discussions over Government action kept Congress busy, 
while automakers nervously observed their cash reserves, which were rapidly approaching zero. 
The Bush administration then used funds of the TARP to provide emergency financing support 
to keep the aforementioned companies operational at least for some more months until a final 
decision could be reached. (Kruger & Goolsbee, 2015) 
They received the loans under the condition of presenting fundamental and viable restructuring 
plans until February 2009. However, the plans that were submitted in February were rejected 
and seen as unrealistic. Time became a critical resource. Chrysler started to sell assets in order 
to obtain some cash. Nevertheless, the financial situation worsened due to the ongoing financial 
crisis.  
The idea of a merger between GM and Chrysler was discussed intensively. Experts, however, 
doubted that two failing companies would do significantly better in this environment even if 
they merged.  
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Zandi and Scott (2008) studied the effects of a possible bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler. They 
both agreed that it would have significant macroeconomic effects due to a series of negative 
chain reactions. According to them, 2.5 – 3.3 million jobs would have been at risk. Therefore, 
they concluded that the costs of not rescuing the three companies were smaller than the costs 
of granting loans.  
Americans were generally skeptical about Government bailouts in order to stabilize the private 
sector. As one of the most liberal countries in the world, the faith in markets was still present, 
even though markets had collapsed. Politicians wanted to avoid making the same mistakes as 
Japan, where the Government propped up “zombie firms”, which survived thanks to the 
Government’s help, but were otherwise not at all viable. Even more interesting, studies found 
out that the capital-intensive automotive sector provided a terrible “bang-for-the-buck basis”, 
which means that using money to help other industries would have a better employment impact. 
(Kruger & Goolsbee, 2015) 
The consensus among experts about the significance of GM was strong. The question was rather 
whether Chrysler should be saved from bankruptcy as well. Kruger and Goolsbee (2015) 
highlighted the fact that GM, Ford, and Chrysler had overlapping markets. A theoretical failure 
of Chrysler would have had less of an impact, since GM and Ford offered products comparable 
to those of Chrysler and would therefore have been able to satisfy market demands. In addition 
to that, Chrysler remained unsuccessful for years, even though it had been acquired and 
restructured by Daimler and Cerberus capital.  
4.2.2 The decision, the bailout and new start 
The newly elected president Obama wanted to prevent the risk of a failure of the two companies 
and concluded that saving them both would ultimately result less harmful to the American 
economy as a whole. However, he personally rejected the presented restructuring plans in 
February 2009 and ordered new and more viable plans of both companies, this time in 
collaboration with external turnaround experts who were personally selected by the White 
House.  
On January 20 2009, Fiat and Chrysler agreed on a non-binding letter of intent. Both were 
committed to fully investigate a possible alliance for the future.  
The first agreement foresaw the exchange of important patents, platforms and fuel-efficient 
engines. Furthermore, both companies would share their distribution networks. Fiat would get 
an initial 35% stake in Chrysler and the option to further expand its participation in the company 
to an additional 20% after one year.  
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In the meanwhile, the Federal Government prepared the Automotive Industry Finance Program. 
It contained a precise catalogue of promised actions that would allow the concerned companies 
to streamline their operations and to become competitive and profitable again.  
Chrysler Financial, a special purpose entity, first obtained a $1.5 billion bridge-loan for the 
extension of new consumer auto loans as part of a broader program to assists the domestic 
automotive industry on January 16, 2009.  
Chrysler originally calculated the needed support to be around $7 billion and it additionally 
asked the Energy Department for a $6 billion loan in order to finance an energy efficiency 
program.  
Thanks to the efforts of Fiat’s CEO Marchionne, the U.S. Government was quickly convinced 
that FIAT would be the best possible candidate for an alliance. Chrysler was facing significant 
problems such as a lack of fuel-efficient engines, quality issues, poor brand image, and 
dependency on the national market. (Balcet, Commisso, & Calabrese, 2013) 
On March 2009, the White House provided the required loans with some conditions. An 
ultimatum of 30 negotiation days with FIAT was set up, otherwise, bankruptcy would be 
unavoidable. Furthermore, the Government demanded that Fiat, as the most probable partner, 
receive a stake in Chrysler gradually, starting from 20% and only extendable under the 
condition of a transfer of technologies. In addition to that, the majority stake could not be 
obtained until the public loans were fully reimbursed (Caputo, 2015). 
The negotiations with banks and hedge funds, which Chrysler owed nearly $7 billion, failed. 
Chrysler had to file for bankruptcy on April 30 2009 (Kruger & Goolsbee, 2015). Several 
restructuring measures were immediately implemented such as wage reductions and the 
termination of dealerships. Tim Geithner gave permission for additional $6 billion to fund the 
operations during the bankruptcy process. However, the production was totally shut down.  
Under the protection of Chapter 11 code, Chrysler was allowed to reorganize its operations. 
Labor unions, creditors, Fiat, and the Government, which provided the necessary funds and 
guarantees, tried to work out an acceptable solution for all parties. They were aware of the fact 
that thousands of jobs were at risk.  
Within five weeks, the parties found a viable solution. Chrysler Group LLC was founded. The 
new entity was owned majorly by the UAW (United Auto Workers) in order to guarantee 
pension payments and to compensate wage cuts. They received a 55 percent stake.  
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Fiat, through its American subsidiary Fiat North America LLC, got a minority stake of 20% in 
exchange for technology transfers and received control over the corporate restructuring. The 
possibility to expand the ownership was linked with performance targets. In addition to that, 
FIAT was prohibited from getting a majority stake until the American taxpayer was fully 
reimbursed. (Caputo, 2015) 
The government kept the remaining 25% in their own hands as compensation and pledge for 
the granted loans. The U.S. Supreme Court approved the agreement on June 10, 2009. On the 
same date, the newly founded entity became operational.  
Chrysler and the Government were initially criticized for giving Chrysler’s 20% share to Fiat 
at no cost. Furthermore, many feared that Chrysler would not survive the time span needed in 
order to implement the new policies and to start the production of the new, jointly developed 
and fuel-efficient cars.  
5. Fiat S.p.a. 
5.1 Fiat in the 21st century 
Any understanding of the past of Fiat as well as Chrysler needs to start with a careful 
consideration of the consolidation process in the whole industry. Starting back in the late 80ies, 
market concentration and diversification increased steadily and significantly. Balcet, 
Commisso, and Calabrese stated that in contrast with the past, automotive producers focused 
more on market segment diversification rather than on geographic presence. Many companies 
started to introduce luxurious brands as well as micro cars in order to cover the full range of 
consumer needs. (Balcet et al., 2013) 
The Italian car manufacturer was bleeding cash. In 2000, FIAT accounted the last positive 
income statement for years. The highly indebted company was facing a downward spiral in 
sales revenues and launched several restructuring programs. (Fiat, 2005a) The fundamental 
problem in Turin was that they failed to notice that competitors in Europe and around the globe 
were overtaking FIAT in terms of innovation, product quality, and performance. FIAT, which 
lost one third of its market share in Europe, could not address these problems, given that it was 
continuously threatened to crumble at any moment under its own debt of $13 billion. In reality, 
the management team and the owner family Agnelli had shifted their focus from the automotive 
division towards a diversification through acquisitions. Fiat holding invested in many different 
businesses, but simultaneously reduced the expenditures for R&D drastically.  
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FIAT established an agreement with General Motors in 2000, which foresaw the acquisition of 
a 20% minority stake of Fiat Auto by GM. In addition to that, FIAT got a “put” option to sell 
the remaining 80% starting in 2004. (Corsi, 2002) Italian and American newspapers celebrated 
the alliance, even though the ongoing merger of DaimlerChrysler showed poor results. Soon, 
GM was frustrated about the poor economic performance of its European partner and many 
doubted that FIAT would be worth another investment or eventually a takeover.  
Necessary restructuring measurements met hard resistance, given that the labor unions had 
massive influence and enjoyed considerable protection in Italy.  
5.2 Marchionne the savior 
Volpato wrote in his book “Fiat Auto” about the overall problems that led to the deep crisis of 
Fiat in the 21st century. According to him, the management was not able to perceive their own 
mistakes or to counteract in a proper way. (Volpato, 2005) The management style was defined 
by a “top-down” approach, whereas other corporations had already introduced a more modern 
and adequate “bottom up” system. “Bottom up” management is characterized by innovations 
driven by the personnel. The classical hierarchical structure loses importance.  
Volpato meant to know who was responsible for the poor performance and the lack of 
innovations. When Paolo Fresco became CEO of Fiat in 1998, he was already 65 years old. 
Giovanni Agnelli, president of the Fiat group until his death in 2003, appointed him personally.  
Fresco was responsible for the negotiations with General Motors and had earned great respect 
for the transaction he closed in 2000. The newspapers celebrated his deal that immediately 
brought 2 billion dollars for Fiat. However, as already described, Fiat’s performance worsened 
and the overall perception of Fresco’s management skills began to shift.  
Cullino and Fabrizi (2005) further criticized the Fresco’s inability to address the four main 
strategic principles of the automotive sector of the 21st century.  
According to them, successful car producers perceived and implemented the following four 
principles: 
1) Increased product differentiation: more car models, ranging from the micro car to the 
sport car  
2) Decreased time-to-market timespan: a reduction of the development phase in order 
to react quicker to consumer trends 
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3) Continuous reduction of production costs: low margins did not allow producing 
inefficiently 
4) Increased R&D expenditures: In order to meet new environmental and safety 
requirements, companies needed to research and develop more 
Fiat, instead, failed to make fundamental investments in order to meet the new market 
requirements.  
In January 2003, Giovanni Agnelli died of prostate cancer and his younger brother Umberto 
became chairman of the Fiat group. The 68-year-old Umberto started to restructure Fiat and 
refocused on its auto division. Giuseppe Morchio was elected as CEO and was expected to 
present a rescue strategy for the troubled company. 
Unfortunately, Umberto died in 2004, just about a year after the death of his brother. Giovanni 
Agnelli’s heir and designated president of the Fiat group, John Elkann, was still too young for 
the presidency. Instead, Ferrari’s chairman Luca di Montezemolo was appointed as chairman 
of the Fiat group, while Elkann joined the board as Vice-chairman. (Fiat, 2005a) 
CEO Morchio was proposing himself as president of the group. However, the Agnelli family 
rejected this proposal and dismissed Morchio. After a hasty search for an adequate candidate, 
the decision was made in favor of board member Marchionne. 
Sergio Marchionne, born in 1952 in Chieti, was appointed officially in June 1 2004, as the CEO 
of the Fiat group. (Fiat, 2005a) 
Marchionne gained control of a company deeply in crisis. Fiat dropped to the 10th place of the 
largest car producers in the world. (Berta, 2006) In addition to that, he found himself in the 
center of a frustrated business environment, where previous attempts of Morchio or Fresco to 
restructure the company have failed.  
Marchionne started his successful career as CEO of Fiat with firing some members of the 
existing management team. His perception was that Fiat was “overmanaged” and “underled”. 
This move was seen as unprecedented, since people at the management level had never before 
experienced radical lay-offs. Marchionne set a clear signal that nobody would not be 
replaceable.  
Furthermore, Marchionne was convinced that the deal with GM would not be sustainable and 
he tried to get the most out of the deal. With the “put” option in his hands, Marchionne had the 
goal of convincing GM to pay Fiat for not exercising its option.  
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After several months of negotiations, the new CEO closed a deal in February 2005, which 
foresaw that GM would pay 2 billion dollar in order to settle the option agreement. (Berta, 
2006) Italian newspapers celebrated the deal as the first major success of Marchionne who 
dispossessed $2 billion, emergently needed at the Fiat side. However, the Economist wrote that 
the capital injection alone would not solve Fiat’s substantial problems.  
The second major challenge for Marchionne was the “convertendo” loan, established with the 
largest Italian creditors in 2002. The threat of converting the loans into shares, which would 
allow the banks to control the firm with a majority stake, still existed.  
In April 2005, Marchionne and Montezemolo met the CEOs of the major Italian bank. They 
reached an agreement in which the banks guaranteed their financial support, if the performance 
goals set by FIAT itself for 2005, 2006 and 2007 would be met. It gave FIAT security that the 
banks would not convert their loans into shares. (Berta, 2006) 
In August 2005, Fiat presented “il Piano di Sviluppo di Fiat Auto” in Rome, a restructuring 
plan for the Fiat automobile division. The objectives for FIAT auto were ambitious. Already in 
2005, the introduction of a series of new products should start. The model span would be 
enlarged to be more diversified and more innovative. Especially the launch of models not yet 
announced, such as the Fiat 500, a new Lancia SUV, and a series of high-end Alfa-Romeo 
models should allow Fiat to make the turnaround happen and to obtain the profitability needed 
for further investments in R&D. 
In addition to that, Fiat launched a new department the “Fiat Powertrain Technologies” in an 
effort to bundle competences and innovations. The development of new fuel-efficient, two-
cylinder motors was planned for 2008-2010. (Fiat, 2005b) 
Fiat clearly outlined the conditions under which the turnaround plan for 2005-2008 could be 
realized. First of all, the profitability had to increase as projected in order to finance the new 
investments. In addition to that, Fiat held an access to Government innovation funds to be 
necessary for the implementation.  
As far as the operational issues were concerned, Fiat demanded more flexibility from unions as 
well as a higher productivity. Finally, the most important condition was the support on the part 
of a majority of stakeholders of the restructuring plan put together by the managing board. 
Especially the labor unions that had blocked many structural changes in the past had to show a 
general willingness to follow through on the commitments asked of them in the plan. (Fiat, 
2005b) 
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The commitment of Montezemolo and especially of Marchionne has been extraordinary. In 
spring 2006, they proudly announced the annual statement of 2005, which marked a turning 
point for Fiat. The operational results of Fiat Auto were still negative, but reduced by 600 
million Euros. The overall group results, on the other hand, showed upstream tendencies, with 
net earnings of roughly 1 billion Euros. (Fiat, 2006) 
BBC News wrote in May 2006 that Fiat Auto recorded market-beating profits of 57 million 
Euros in the first quarter of 2006. The new Fiat Grande Punto was a success and Marchionne 
interpreted the results as a sign that the company as a whole was on the right path. (BBC NEWS, 
2006) 
In 2007, while presenting the results of 2006, Marchionne spoke of a new Fiat that had left the 
era of crises and emergency turnaround plans. He proudly announced that Fiat Auto was 
profitable again. The Fiat group registered a trading profit of nearly €2 billion, almost doubling 
the results of 2005. (Fiat, 2007) 
To underline the new appearance, while at the same time honoring its glorious past, Fiat 
launched the new Fiat 500 on July 4, 2007 at Torino. The model was celebrated by many 
automotive journalists and won several awards such as “Car of the Year 2008”. (Fiat, 2008) 
Car sales of Fiat increased steadily. The revenues in 2007 rose about 13%, which corresponded 
with a plus of 12.8% in deliveries. In addition to that, Fiat achieved market share increases. 
(Fiat, 2008)  
Marchionne announced the completion of the industrial turnaround plan established back in 
2004. All targets were met in time and in many cases, the company was able to exceed them 
significantly. Shareholders appreciated Marchionne’s work. Fiat’s share price rose from 5€ at 
the time of his appointment to an all-time high of 21€ in July 2007.  
5.3 FIAT and the financial crisis 
Despite the impressive recovery since the appointment of Marchionne, experts agreed that 
Fiat’s success came mainly from cost reductions and increases in efficiency. Marchionne knew 
that their product portfolio was old fashioned. However, the delay in upgrading the product 
portfolio towards higher-priced compact models was further affected by the financial crisis in 
2008. 
Most of the European governments launched programs of financial incentives in order to absorb 
the shock in demand. These incentives, which often only targeted small and eco-friendly cars, 
while being initially successful and responsible for an increase in sales, such success was 
- 42 - 
ultimately rooted in a shift of demand. The strategy might have led to an uprise of anticipated 
purchases of small vehicles, but ended in an even more severe shortfall once the incentive 
period came to a close. 
Marchionne continued to emphasize the problems of Fiat. Its elevated structural costs, the low 
utilization of capacity and outdated product portfolio proved to be a burden for both Marchionne 
and the complete realignment of Fiat. (Berta, 2006) 
Moreover, Fiat was still considered as “too small” when compared to its direct competitors. 
Bearing this in mind, Marchionne started to pursue a strategy of scale and scope economies 
through mergers and acquisitions.  
6. The FCA era  
6.1 The strategy for a full merger 
According to Balcet, Commisso, and Calabrese (2013), Fiat, after the acquisition of the 20% 
stake, has pursued three main goals, which nearly all manufacturers try to achieve: 
1) Substantial economies of scale 
2) Increase productivity and reduce costs 
3) Expand the presence in growing and profitable markets  
Fiat’s integration plan foresaw the redefinition of the product portfolio of both companies and 
to rationalize models, engines and platforms. Fiat already had one of the most diversified 
product portfolios, with products ranging from super sport car brands such as Ferrari down to 
micro cars along the lines of the Fiat 500. Despite Fiat’s impressive portfolio, Marchionne still 
feared that Fiat might be too small to compete. In Marchionne’s mind the best way out of this 
impasse was a full merger with Chrysler as it had the potential to unlock significant economies 
of scale by sharing platforms, much in the same way it had been done previously by its German 
main competitor Volkswagen Group.   
The plan consisted of three platforms, all developed by Fiat, and with around one million 
annually produced vehicles for each platform. The compact size platform would then be 
modified and adopted so that Chrysler’s mid-size vehicles would fit.  
Fiat and Chrysler were committed to standardize and unify components that can be considered 
as transversal to all models and platforms. The management focused on components such as 
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the powertrain, steering or lighting that can amount to 75% of the total production costs. 
(Bertoldi, Giachino, Bernard, & Prudenza, 2015) 
A further step to cut costs was dependent upon a fusion between the Lancia and Chrysler brands. 
Identical models were sold under different brands to save marketing and promoting 
expenditures. In addition, both the Fiat and the Dodge brands were sharing a model, namely the 
“Freemont” that became successful even on the European market. 
The most important exchange for Chrysler was Fiat’s fuel-efficient four cylinder engines. 
Chrysler and its gas-guzzling line-up was required to meet the new pollution and environmental 
requirements and therefore was able to save millions by using Fiat’s fully developed engine 
portfolio instead of having to work on an in-house developed engine from scratch. However, 
Fiat’s technology did not come without a price tag: Fiat’s twenty percent stake in Chrysler.  
The introduction and implementation of the WCM (world-class manufacturing) system allowed 
Fiat and Chrysler to better focus on value-adding processes and to reduce costs, waste as well 
as defective vehicles. (Balcet et al., 2013) 
The WCM was based on the ABC-model (activity-based costing) which splits complex 
processes into single activities and analyzes them according to “value adding” criteria. 
Unnecessary or non- value adding activities should be removed in order to reduce costs or waste 
and to create capacities for more profitable processes. (Azizi & Modares, 2002) 
Fiat and Fiat Industrial had already experience with WCM. The management expected nearly 
€2 billion in savings over a period ranging from 2010 to 2014. In addition to that, Marchionne 
pushed for an immediate implementation at Chrysler’s plants. Forecasts predicted cumulative 
savings of another €1 billion over the next five years. (Bertoldi et al., 2015) 
However, the greatest saving potential lied in the combination of the companies’ purchasing. 
The merger made it possible to create significant and consistent savings on purchases. After 
two years, in 2011, both firms together exceeded a total volume of €50 billion of purchases and 
expected cumulative savings of roughly €5 billion over the 2010-2014 period.  
Fiat and Chrysler also optimized the development of their models. In order to react effectively 
to market and consumer changes, both companies needed to minimize the product development 
time span. They made significant progress and reduced the internal development cycle, from 
the technical release to the official market launch, to 18 months.  
In addition to that, Fiat and Chrysler were able to provide a more diversified product mix with 
respect to the portfolio as it had been before the acquisition. Thanks to Chrysler’s compact cars 
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and the Jeep brand’s SUVs, Fiat managed for the first time to also step outside the low-price 
segment inside which its products had previously been concentrated.  
6.2 The timeline 
After its failed alliance with GM, Fiat tried to realize a full operational merger, before 
considering a financial tie-up. (Bertoldi et al., 2015) The requirements and targets made by the 
U.S. government forced Fiat to fully focus on the operational side first, before being legally 
allowed to acquire a higher participation in Chrysler. There was no way of increasing its stake 
in Chrysler, without first meeting those targets. This helped clearly to increase the pressure on 
the management team.  
While according to the agreement, Fiat held a minority stake reminiscent of a joint venture, in 
reality the arrangement between the two companies was closer to a real progressive merger. 
Fiat used the sales and distribution network of Chrysler in order to sell its Alfa Romeo brand 
along with first time sales of Fiat products in America. Chrysler instead, benefited from the 
strong position of Fiat in South America. 
Yet, the first two years were rough. In November 2010, the New York Times reported that 
Chrysler drifted further behind its long-term rivals Ford and GM. (Vlasic & Bunkley, 2010). 
The latter showed impressive recovery results, especially Ford was for the first time able to 
reach levels that came close those prior to the recession. Marchionne was still confident about 
the future of Chrysler.  
Soon after, on May 2 2011, the New York Times had to go back on its initial projections for 
Chrysler’s finances. Chrysler accounted a staggering 35% revenue growth in the first quarter 
along with the company’s first profits after years of bad news (Bunkley, 2011). Marchionne 
immediately interpreted the results as “a testament to the hard work and dedication of our 
employees, suppliers and dealers, all of whom are helping Chrysler create a new corporate 
culture built on the quality of our products and processes, and simple, sound management 
principles.” (Bunkley, 2011) 
On January 2011, Fiat fulfilled its first target, previously defined in the operating agreement 
with the government. The U.S. treasury consequently approved the start of production of the 
fully integrated robotized engine in Dundee, which was the first performance milestone. Fiat 
automatically gained 5% of participation.  
During spring 2011, Fiat met the second innovation milestone and its participation rose to 30%. 
Soon after, on May 24, Chrysler Group proudly announced the repayment of all of its 
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outstanding government loans. Chrysler paid back its $7.6 billion of U.S. and Canadian 
government loans six months in advance. Fiat on the other hand, exercised its 16% equity call 
option as granted in the operating agreement by paying $1.3 billion to the U.S. carmaker. Hence, 
Fiat’s participation increased by another 16% and reached 46% in total.  
Already two months later, on July 21 2011, Fiat purchased an additional 7.5% previously held 
by the U.S. and Canadian governments. The public pressure on the governments to sell their 
stake after the repayment of the outstanding loans was definitely beneficial for Fiat at that time.  
Fiat paid $700 million in order to obtain the stakes of both governments. It meant that Fiat 
finally controlled the Chrysler Corporation also in an official capacity, even though, from a 
practical standpoint, Marchionne had already managed Chrysler since the beginning of their 
cooperation. (Fiat, 2012) 
The group concluded 2011 as a consolidated company. The operating profits kept growing and 
especially Fiat showed good results and doubled its operating profits. (Fiat, 2012) 
In January 2012, Fiat-Chrysler reached Chrysler’s third performance milestone. The realization 
of the Dodge Dart, a fuel-efficient compact car based on a Fiat platform, provided Fiat with an 
additional 5% of shares. Fiat now held 58.5% of Chrysler and was making preparations for the 
purchase the outstanding 41.5% of VEBA (Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association Trust) 
In 2013, Fiat prepared itself for the minority stake acquisition of UAW (United Auto Workers). 
Chrysler filed documents in order to obtain a public stock offering. The UAW was afraid that 
the price paid by Fiat would not correspond with the fair value of the shares.  
Fiat was suffering from the European recession and the Italian debt crisis. In 2013, total 
passenger car registrations fell to 11.5 million cars. (ACEA, 2013) Fiat’s operating performance 
was poor. After €187 million of EBIT in 2012, Fiat reported losses of €188 million in 2013 
(Fiat, 2014). In the same year, Chrysler’s sales grew by 3%. The group results were positive, 
thanks to Chrysler’s performance (Fiat, 2014). 
Marchionne was well known as one of the hardest negotiators within the car business. He 
reached an agreement with VEBA, in which VEBA’s payout was less than expected. Fiat gained 
full control of Chrysler by paying $4.35 billion to the trust. Fiat acquired the 41.46% stake by 
paying $3.65 billion in cash and $700 million gradually over three years. More interesting was 
the fact that the cash amount came from Fiat and Chrysler’s reserves. Chrysler’s contribution 
was $1.9 billion and paid, at least to a certain extent, for its sale to Fiat (Reuters, 2014).  
- 46 - 
The deal became effective on January 20, 2014. The deal allowed Fiat Chrysler to avoid a public 
IPO for the stake of VEBA. The acquisition after an IPO would have been far more costly.  
The acquisition of the outstanding shares did also pave the way for a complete merger from a 
legal perspective. The plan of the management teams on both sides of the Atlantic consisted in 
founding a new legal entity, namely FCA. FCA should be incorporated in the Netherlands. 
Marchionne justified the move with an increased competiveness. FCA should be more 
competitive in respect with its competitors also regarding taxation.  
The criticism in Italy and the U.S. were loud. However, FCA was established on October 13, 
2014 and was listed on the stock exchange of New York and Milan. Marchionne commented 
the successful listing in the following way:“FCA’s listing today on Wall Street is the 
culmination of five-and-a-half years of work to achieve an extraordinary union. It marks the 
hard-won arrival at a destination. Yet, like so many milestones, it represents not just an ending, 
but also a new beginning – the beginning of our journey as one global automaker, one FCA.” 
(FCA, 2015) 
7. A valuation model for M&A transactions 
7.1 Introduction 
To assess whether a M&A transaction might be successful or not is the most important task 
prior to the conclusion of the agreement itself. Interestingly, most of the existing models fail to 
analyze multiple dimensions. Synergies are considered to be the most important measurement 
for potential success. Experts do agree that the success of a M&A transaction depend on several 
components. As already mentioned, strategic compatibility, the M&A plan and implementation, 
cultural fit as well as macro-economic issues play an important role.  
Studies have emphasized that the failure rate of M&As still exceeds 50%. Therefore, an 
instrument to value the compatibility of two merging companies would be urgently needed.  
Many empirical studies have considered the value creation in M&A transactions. Most of them 
tried to find key drivers by analyzing a vast number of past transactions. Mukherjee et al (2004), 
focused on the merger motives of CFOs. However, strong potential synergies or diversification 
desires do not guarantee success, even though they were named as the most important motives 
for mergers.  
Prior research did not cover the overall differences of Daimler and Fiat that might explain the 
failure of DaimlerChrysler and the success of FCA. Studies, such as the paper of Pedersen about 
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the acculturation in M&As with reference to DaimlerChrysler and FCA, touched only on one 
of the reasons for the mergers failure. It is generally agreed that cultural clashes lead to more 
problems during the merger implementation phase and often cause insuperable hurdles. 
Nevertheless, there are millions of cross-border mergers that had success despite significant 
cultural differences. The Italian culture also appears to be different from the American one. Yet 
the Fiat Chrysler merger, was successful despite those differences. Hence, it can be concluded 
that the cultural differences alone would not be the determining factor for success.  
During the M&A process, the M&A teams and their respective advisors are well aware of 
potential risks and problems of a merger. Potential synergies but also risks are often graphically 
presented during the presentation in front of the senior management. However, people tend to 
be blinded by the promise of a wide range of advantages a merger could yield and furthermore 
struggle to identify the right candidate amid the many reasons a merger could fail.  
Researchers have tried to figure out reasons for why M&As have such a high rate of failure, 
however, there is little, or no material at all able to provide tools capable of depicting and 
calculating the likelihood of success of M&A transactions prior to their conclusion. In order to 
assess the general compatibility of merger candidates and therefore the probability of success, 
my idea was to develop a universal and multidimensional model. The model was thought to 
provide a quick but reliable overview about the probability for a successful merger. M&A teams 
struggle to deliver understandable information about the compatibility of candidates during the 
screening process.  
7.2 Research Design 
It was clear that a potential model had to be multidimensional so as to incorporate multiple 
important factors of M&A transactions. However, in order to simplify the operation and to 
provide a fast tool to assess compatibility, only the four main success drivers were included.  
The base model consists of a slightly modified Cartesian coordinate model. Instead of two axes 
x and y, reaching from -∞ to + ∞, it is advisable to change it into a four axes model, starting 
from zero at the intercept and ending with five.  
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Table 5 - The model basis 
The four axes illustrate the compatibility of two merger candidates, each axis has a maximum 
compatibility (perfect fit) of five and a minimum compatibility of zero (no fit).  
The selection of the success drivers was based on empirical studies. As many studies and books 
show, the four most important reasons for a successful merger are the following: 
(1) Potential synergies:  The amount of potential savings and improvements 
(2) Strategic fit:  The strategic compatibility of two merging companies 
(3) Cultural fit:  The compatibility of two corporations from a cultural point 
(4) Post-merger plan: The quality of the integration plan  
1. Potential synergies 
Potential synergies often provide the basis for an M&A consideration and are named as the 
most important motives. The combined value of both companies after a merger should 
therefore be greater than the sum of the standalone value of each company prior to the 
merger. This can be achieved by realizing economies of scale and scope as well as working 
more cost efficient. 
The amount of potential synergies fundamentally matters in the valuation model. It is 
assumed that the pressure on the management and personnel depends on the amount of 
potential synergies. When only few synergies are available, the pressure of a precise and 
effective implementation is high. On the other hand, whenever a multitude of synergies can 
be explored, even a lower realization rate would be considered a success, since the absolute 
amount in savings would still be positive and the fact the merged companies would still 
yield greater advantages than compared to their situation prior to the merger. 
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However, as McNish, Sias and Christofferson (2004) state, it is important to acknowledge 
dis-synergies in revenues and subtract them from the estimated synergies. Dis-synergies 
result from the disruption of both companies and a consumer loss during the integration 
phase.  
According to Kengelbach et al. (2013), the median announced synergy per industry varies 
widely. They surveyed a sample of 365 deals with transaction values of more than $300 
million that took place from 2000 until 2011. The overall median throughout all industries 
was around 1.5% of synergies of the combined sales of both merging companies. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that a generic formula would not make sense.  
It is advisable to create an industry specific categorization model in order to match 
announced synergies with the score system of the proposed model.  
Starting with the median of the appropriate industry, based on the research of Kengelback et 
al. (2013), the scores are distributed in the following way: 
Let x be the announced synergies of the merger in percentage of the forecasted combined 
revenues and 𝜇 the industry median value: 
MODEL SCORE RULE 
0 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 − 2𝜎 
1 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 − 1𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥  𝜇 − 2𝜎 
2 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥ 𝜇 − 1𝜎 
3 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 + 1𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥ 𝜇 
4 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 + 2𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥  𝜇 + 1𝜎 
5 If 𝑥 > 𝜇 + 2𝜎 
Unfortunately, Kengelbach et al. (2013), did not reveal the standard deviation of the sample. 
However, they provided detailed numbers of synergies in the oil industry. Assuming that the 
standard deviation might be similar in most of the sectors, it was computed and used as a 
reference. The standard deviation in the oil industry was 0.54. 
By applying the described valuation model, a final score for the synergy effect is obtained. 
The number can be used for the further computation of the total fit.  
2. Strategic compatibility 
Strategic compatibility is a broad term and is hard to define accurately. Shelton (1988) states 
that the strategic fit is given, when two firms have created value that would not otherwise 
have been created, if the same goal had been pursued separately. Shelton went further and 
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introduced the terms of related-complementary and related-supplementary fits. The former 
brings new products together, i.e. assets and skills of already shared markets; the latter, on 
the other hand, adds new markets while products and assets stay the same.  
 
Table 6 - Shelton's Strategic Fit Model 
Shelton (1988) states that unrelated businesses correspond with a low potential of possible 
synergies, whereas related-supplementary companies could lead to significant economies of 
scale. Related-complementary businesses instead, translate into a high potential for 
economies of scope and give the opportunity to strengthen the market position and expand 
the product portfolio. In the case of identical businesses, cross-sellings as well as economies 
of scale are possible.  
Shelton went further and tested the four fits for value creation. The outcome was a ranking 
showing the ability to create value. The ranking showed identical companies to be the 
strongest, followed by related-supplementary companies in second place, related-
complementary in third and unrelated businesses in fourth place. 
A second, even more interesting approach is the case of complementarity companies in 
strategic fits. Medcof’s overlapping model stresses the ability of companies to cover the 
weaknesses of each other. Medcof (1997) developed a model that graphically represent two 
firms and their respective strengths and weaknesses. If they do not overlap, the conditions 
for a successful merger are positive. 
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In order to determine the final valuation of the strategic fit of two merging companies, it is 
necessary to apply a strengths and weaknesses analysis on both firms. The shortened SWOT 
analysis should identify the major strengths and weaknesses in the following segments: 
A) MARKETS  
The companies are valued under the aspect of their markets. What are their 
strengths and where could weaknesses be detected.  
B) PRODUCTS 
An analysis of the product portfolio is conducted. What are the strengths of each 
company? Where do the comparative advantages lie in? What are possible 
weaknesses, such as quality, low diversification, or lack of innovation? 
C) TECHNOLOGY 
The strengths and weaknesses analysis is also applied to the field of technology and 
innovations. What are the technological strengths of each company? Do they 
possess valuable patents or licenses?  
D) EFFICIENCY 
In addition, the efficiency of both merger candidates is assessed. How efficient are 
the IT systems, how productive their plants?  
E) PERFORMANCE 
The financial performance is the last aspect to be valued. Both companies are tested 
in terms of their profitability, how their growth rates have developed and how 
indebted they are.  
The final score of the total strategic fit is obtained through a simple comparison of the 
strengths and weaknesses of both companies. Each complementation of strengths and 
weaknesses corresponds with one point. Therefore, since five categories exist, the total 
possible score would be the maximum of five, which is to say a perfect strategic fit.  
In other words, the two candidates would perfectly complement each other and neutralize 
the weaknesses of each other. The ideal conditions for a successful merger. On the other 
hand, if two completely equal companies merge, corporations with the same strengths and 
weaknesses, the score would be equal to zero. It would be unlikely that the combined 
businesses create more value than each business considered by itself, even though some 
saving potentials would definitely exist.  
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3. Cultural fit 
The third axis of the model describes the cultural fit or compatibility of two companies. As 
already explained, cultural discrepancies were one of the major issues in the 
DaimlerChrysler deal. Even though the management team was aware of some problems, it 
failed completely to address them. Cultural differences in cross-border mergers can be 
hurdles hard to overcome. However, the corporate culture itself can differ from national 
cultural standards. According to my opinion, it is more accurate to analyze the internal 
culture and compare it with the culture of the merger candidate. 
In order to value the corporate culture in a standardized way, the Berlitz COI© (Cultural 
Orientations Indicator) was used as a starting point. Berlitz, a global corporation in 
leadership and language training, developed an indicator to develop culturally competent 
leaders. It should train managers to be aware of cultural differences and behavior. Berlitz 
describes it as a framework for describing, comparing, mapping, and analyzing the 
components of culture at any level. It provides a shared language and comprehensive lens 
with which to analyze cultural phenomena and cultural encounters. (Berlitz, 2010) 
Berlitz’s unique COI© model assesses 10 dimensions and 21 sub dimensions of workplaces 
based on perception and preferences in the work environment.  
The 10 dimensions are: 
1. Environment 
2. Time 
3. Action 
4. Communication 
5. Space 
6. Power  
7. Individualism 
8. Competitiveness 
9. Structure 
10. Thinking 
The ten dimensions try to plot the view of individuals in the corporation and their perception 
of culture. The complex sub dimensions were simplified and constructed in way so that the 
model provides two possible perceptions for each dimension. 
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Environment:   control/harmonic 
Time:   traditions oriented/ future oriented 
Action:   being/doing 
Communication: formal & indirect/informal & direct 
Space:   private/public 
Power:   hierarchy/equality 
Individualism: individualistic/collectivistic 
Competitiveness: competitive/cooperative 
Structure:  order/flexibility 
Thinking:  deductive/inductive 
Schmitz and Butera provided further clarifications regarding the single dimensions of the 
COI© model in their manual. (Schmitz & Butera, n.d.) The manual explains how the 
different dimensions are applied. The table below was extracted from their work.  
Cultural 
Dimension 
Cultural 
Continuum 
Cultural Orientations  
Descriptions 
Environment Control 
 
Harmony 
People can dominate the environment; it can be 
changed to fit human needs. 
People should live in harmony with the world 
around them. 
Time Tradition oriented 
Future oriented 
High value placed on continuance of traditions. 
Willingness to trade short-term gain for long-
term results. 
Action Being 
 
 
Doing 
Relationship-centered. Stress placed on working 
for the moment; experience rather than 
accomplishment. 
Task-centered. Stress placed on productive 
activities in goal accomplishment and 
achievement. 
Communication Direct 
 
 
Indirect 
Preference for explicit one- or two-way 
communication, including identification, 
diagnosis and management of conflict. 
Preference for implicit communication and 
conflict avoidance. 
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Space Private 
 
Public 
Individual orientation to the use of physical 
space. Preference for distance between 
individuals. 
Group orientation to the use of physical space. 
Preference for close proximity. 
Power Hierarchy 
 
Equality 
Value placed on power differences between 
individuals and groups. 
Value placed on the minimization of levels of 
power. 
Individualism Individualistic 
 
Collectivistic 
The “I” predominates over the “we.” 
Independence is highly valued. 
Individual interests are subordinate to group 
interests. Identity is based on the social network. 
Loyalty is highly valued. 
Competitiveness Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
Achievement, assertiveness and material success 
are reinforced. 
Stress is placed on the quality of life, 
interdependence and relationships. 
Structure Order 
 
Flexibility 
High need for predictability and rules, written 
and unwritten. The unexpected is not valued. 
Tolerance of unpredictable situations and 
ambiguity. Dissent is acceptable. 
Thinking Deductive 
Inductive 
Reasoning based on theory and logic. 
Reasoning based on experience and 
experimentation. 
After the assessment of the corporate culture of each of the merging companies, the 
outcomes are compared to each other. Every sub dimension in common corresponds with a 
0.5 increment in the final cultural fit score. Fully compatible cultures would obtain the total 
score of five, whereas totally different working cultures with nothing in common would 
result in a total score of zero.  
The final score represents not the compatibility of the two companies, but also the effort that 
is needed to merge the two companies from a cultural standpoint. Most of the cultural 
differences are manageable, provided the management has awareness of them and prepares 
an appropriate plan to overcome those cultural hurdles.  
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4. Post-merger integration plan 
The last and fourth axis represents the quality of the post-merger integration plan. Most of 
the fusions fail due to an inappropriate planning of the post-merger phase. M&A teams 
tend to focus primarily on the evaluation of the most tangible candidate and the 
quantification of the possible synergies, but underestimate the importance of the post-
merger integration. Most of the time, good synergies on paper do not automatically lead to 
good synergies in practice. In addition to that, the results and integration steps have to be 
monitored and reviewed, and adjustments of the plans have to be made. 
According to Khanna (2013), the real challenge is to create value during the post-merger 
phase. Khanna states that the most important time frame are the first 90 days, where the 
path is set and feasibility of the plan is mostly tested.  
Given its importance, the post-merger plan has to play an essential role in the valuation 
model. However, the challenge consists in finding a standardized method for valuation. 
The first step is to understand how difficult the analyzed merger would be to perform. 
There are different kinds of mergers. From a full-integration merger down to a merger 
where both companies continue to exist with their respective brands, networks and 
administrations.  
Table 7 – Post Merger Integration  
Source: (Khanna, 2013, www.uni-stuttgart.de/infotech/pdf/bma13/BMA13_Mergers.pdf) 
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It is important to underline that a merger plan has to be more sophisticated when two 
companies want to fully merge, on an operational, financial, and administrative level.  
The dynamic is that when synergies and strategic fit are high, the pressure on the merger 
plan increases. Lower merger synergies such as in a merger of equals tend to result in a 
higher probability of catching them, given that the same merger plan and commitment was 
applied. In addition to that, it adjusts for overestimated figures in the announced synergies 
effects. Companies tend to overvalue their potential synergies with another corporation. 
Many studies have shown that the actual number of realized synergies is much lower 
compared to what they announced. 
Graphically it can be explained in the following way: 
 
 
It is fundamental to understand that the cultural fit is independent from such scenarios. 
Instead, high synergies and highly cultural compatible firms will lead to a significant 
improvement of the overall fit.  
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The best-case scenario would be if synergies and strategic fits are high and the merger plan 
is adjusted for the increased difficulty to catch all synergies. The outcome would be an 
almost perfect probability of success.  
To assess the type of merger Hurter developed a practical model. (Hurter, 2011) He 
analyzed five fields: brand strategy, sales, personnel, operations and administration. Hunter 
then went on to provide a tool that allowed for mergers to be understood in terms of one of 
the four types mentioned above: 
 
The was pointed to above, the example depicts four different types of mergers, namely the 
blue marked “Cross-industry deal”, the green “Cross region deal”, the violet “Capability 
deal” and the red “Volume deal” – which is also the most complex of the four. 
In order to implement Hurter’s idea into my valuation model, some changes had to be 
made. Every potential merger is going to be assessed under the criteria of Hurter, however, 
there are only three main categories. The standalone category implies a kind of merger with 
a low level of integration, which facilitates the merger itself. Therefore, each field 
categorized as standalone adds 0.5 points to the final score.  
 The neutral category of “Merger of equals” corresponds to a normal level of integration, 
meaning that some parts are unified, while others are not. The neutral category has no 
impact on the total merger score. As a result, each field adds zero points.  
The “Full-Integration” category, on the other hand, diminishes the final score by 0.5 points 
for each field. The “Full-integration” describes the highest level of integration and is 
One Brand
Unified Sales
One Culture
Bundled Operations
One Headquarter
Partly integrated
Competing Solutions
Shared Divisions
Legacy
Separated Cultures
As given, peripheral
Independent structures
Merger of Equals Full-Integration
Brand FamilySeveral Brands
Best of Both
Brands
Sales
Personnel & Culture
Operations & Supply 
Chain
Administration
Standalone
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therefore the most complex and challenging kind of merger. The increased difficulty also 
decreases the probability of the overall success rate.  
The table below demonstrates graphically how every field is categorized and how it affects 
the overall score. 
Integration level determination Standalone 
Merger of 
Equals 
Full-
integration 
Brands +0.5 0 -0.5 
Sales +0.5 0 -0.5 
Personnel & Culture +0.5 0 -0.5 
Operations & Supply Chain +0.5 0 -0.5 
Administration +0.5 0 -0.5 
The second part of the valuation consists in assessing the post-merger integration plan of 
the merging companies. It is clear that most of the companies will announce great 
commitment and dedication. No company would admit that the dedicated resources might 
be insufficient to achieve the explored synergies.  
Hence, a customized model that analyzes again five fields should be applied. Many experts 
have published academic studies on how important those fields are for the post-merger 
integration: 
1) COMMITMENT: The commitment of the top- and lower level management is key for 
a successful integration. Commitment cannot be measured in an objective way, especially 
at a time prior to the actual merger. However, certain announcements such as indications 
on how the management structure will change or reports on how often controls will be 
conducted, can provide useful information regarding the actual commitment. 
2) RESOURCES: Resources such as capital and workforce are important for the realization 
of the merger synergies. Information about how large the post-merger integration team will 
be or how integration costs are calculated give a glimpse into how dedicated the 
management is to fully merge with the other company.  
3) EXPERIENCE: Experience in the M&A process and especially in the post-merger 
integration can facilitate it significantly. Despite the fact that every merger has its own 
characteristics and is determined by different circumstances, they, in general, share certain 
processes. Experienced knowledge of those processes would help to avoid certain mistakes 
during post-merger integration.  
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4) NECESSITY: It might seem banal, but the necessity for a merger can influence the 
outcome significantly. Examples for necessary mergers can be anything from financial 
troubles of one or both companies to regulatory changes in the market or even changes in 
the macroeconomic environment. Therefore, the pressure on both merging companies is 
higher which in turn leads to a more serious approach and a higher success rate. 
5) COMMUNICATION: The last analyzed field is the communication policy of the 
companies. Proactive and planned communication helps to overcome information 
discrepancies and reduces uncertainty among stakeholders. Investors, suppliers as well as 
the staff appreciate accurate and on-time information. This leads to a better supportive 
behavior in general and increases the probability of success. 
The valuation process itself is similar to the one described before. Each field can be 
characterized with one out of three different categories: negative, neutral and positive. The 
added scores, however, are inverted. A positive plan, for example, adds more points to the 
final score. The table below describes the way in which they operate: 
Merger plan valuation negative neutral positive 
Commitment -0.5 0 +0.5 
Resources -0.5 0 +0.5 
Experience -0.5 0 +0.5 
Necessity -0.5 0 +0.5 
Communication -0.5 0 +0.5 
Since, for the first time, two models are used to determine the final score, the way of 
calculating has to be modified as well. For the previous axes, the score is formed by simply 
summing up the results. In this case, the starting point has to be moved to 2.5. This 
guarantees that, if all valuations are neutral, the final score will be 2.5 instead of zero.  
In addition to that, two limits have to be introduced. Since the scale of the axis is limited, 
the minimum score is zero despite the potential outcome of -2.5 in the case of full-
integration and a negatively valuated plan. The same principle applies to the contrary case 
of a standalone scenario combined with a positive merger plan. The outcome would be 7.5, 
but it should be limited to five.  
 
Mathematically expressed: 
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𝑧 = 2.5 +  ∑ 𝑥𝑖 +  ∑ 𝑦𝑖
5
𝑖=1
5
𝑖=1
 
max 𝑧 = 5 
min 𝑧 = 0 
Where xi = outcomes of the integration level determination, yi = the outcomes of the 
merger plan quality and z = the final score.  
The final score of the merger plan then describes the probability of success of the 
merger.  
7.3 Calculations 
Only when the single motives are valued and plotted, the real calculation can commence. The 
single coordinates are connected and a quadratic or a trapezoidal surface should appear.  
 
The next step is to compute the area of the surface. The surface is divided into four quartiles, 
while the area of each triangle is calculated by applying the formula of the area calculation of 
triangles. The four areas are then summed up in order to determine the total fit. Since the model 
is limited by a maximum of five at each axis, the maximum total fit equals to 12.5 times 4, 
which makes 50.  
The total fit score indicates how compatible two corporations are and how probable a successful 
merger would be.  
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7.4 Limitations 
First of all, it is clear that the model faces several potential limitations, just like most other 
graphical models. It is important to understand the advantages and disadvantages of the model 
in order to correctly interpret the outcome and to be aware of possible misconceptions. The 
model was invented for a rational analysis of the DaimlerChrysler and Fiat Chrysler mergers. 
It should also serve as a denominational tool to explain the failure of the former and the success 
of the latter case.  
The following limitations were discovered during the development of the M&A model: 
1) Definition of “success”: Firstly, it is important to define the term “success”. The 
model predicts the compatibility of two merger candidates and determines somehow the 
probability of a successful merger. Generally, a M&A is defined as “successful” when 
the value of the merged companies is greater than the combined standalone values of 
the two businesses. 
Moreover, the exact moment when measurements are made is critical. Listed companies 
often face distortions during the integration phase. Investors are generally frightened by 
uncertainty and information inequality. Therefore, market capitalization might be lower 
compared to the combined capitalization of the two pre-merger companies.  
2) The assumption of proportioned distribution.  
The nature of the model includes a proportioned weight of each of the four axes. When 
summing up the surfaces, every component is as important as the other. However, the 
reality could well be different. In some cases, the synergies might be more important for 
a successful merger than cultural fit. In order to adapt the model and to introduce 
stretched or compressed axes to reflect differing contributions, an empirical study of all 
the major reasons for success and failure in M&A transactions would have to be done. 
For reasons of simplification, this research is based on the assumption of a proportioned 
contribution of each axis. 
3) Subjective assessment 
The evaluation and assessment of some components remain a subjective perception. The 
merger plan and the evaluation of the corporate culture cannot be based on objective 
facts. Therefore, misinterpretations might be possible. The model should be applied by 
independent consultants in order to avoid personal preferences of the M&A team, which 
- 62 - 
may indirectly influence the outcome by subjectively over- or under valuating certain 
parts of the model.  
4) Interrelations of the single determining factors 
The model is highly interrelated due to the system’s intention of calculating the total fit. 
Since the surface of each quartile is calculated, only two axes at a time can determine 
its dimensions. Given the position of the single axes, relations necessarily appear. 
Synergies, for instance, are linked to the cultural fit as well as the merger plan.  
 
While synergy effects might be high, they would still not contribute to the overall fit, in 
cases where the cultural fit and merger plan were zero. This, to a certain extent, makes 
sense. Potential synergies cannot be achieved, if the merger integration plan fails to 
unlock them or the companies are totally incompatible from a cultural point.  
However, the motives’ positions within the model also imply that at least two of them 
will, at all times, be uncorrelated. For that reason, synergy effects, will always be 
unrelated to the strategic fit; the same holds true when looking at the cultural fit and 
merger plan.  
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Of course, it could also be assumed, that the reality is different: all motives are 
interrelated, even though certain relations are stronger, while others are less significant. 
When applying the model, this limitation has to be kept in mind.  
5) Other critical factors excluded 
The model is meant to graphically represent the preconditions of a possible merger that 
are critical in order to evaluate whether a merger could be successful or not. However, 
it should be noted that many other factors are not included. In fact, the success does not 
only depend on these four major conditions. Macro-economic circumstances, the 
regulatory environment or the behavior of stakeholder as well as the actions undertaken 
by main competitors, can heavily influence the probability of a successful merger.  
Nevertheless, the model provides useful graphical information that allows for an initial 
assessment as to the overall practicality of a profound analysis of potential merger 
candidates. Moreover, the model actively compares compatibility on a standardized and 
intelligible basis among different corporations.  
7.5 The DaimlerChrysler and Fiat Chrysler Cases 
The DaimlerChrysler and the Fiat Chrysler cases are very interesting M&A cases under several 
aspects. Firstly, given their relatively recent occurrence, they reflect current merger issues and 
can be used to understand actual trends in the markets. Secondly, because the intentions for 
concluding a merger, namely to strengthen the global position and to become more competitive 
by merging with the American auto giant, were fairly similar for both car companies. Lastly, 
what makes the DaimlerChrysler and Fiat Chrysler mergers most interesting for the purposes 
of this research is that one failed whereas the other was successful. 
As already mentioned, the differences between Daimler-Benz on one hand and Fiat on the other 
hand, have been quite significant. However, the aim of this thesis was to develop a framework 
that compares merger, highlights intersections and emphasizes potential threats.  
7.5.1 Application of the model – DaimlerChrysler 
In this section, the model is applied to Daimler and Chrysler in order to analyze their overall 
compatibility. The model starts with the analysis of the potential synergies, continues with the 
assessment of the cultural fit, onto the valuation of the strategic fit, and ends in the issuance of 
a final score to the effectiveness of the merger plan.  
Synergies 
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As already described, the task is to compare the potential synergies of the merger with the 
industrial median and to rate the outcome. DaimlerChrysler announced in their statements 
regarding the merger that the combined business would achieve annual $1.4 billion in synergies 
starting in 1999. (DaimlerChrysler, 1999)  
To recall, Kengelbach et. al. (2013) analyzed a range of industries and have found a median for 
each of them. The median describes a percentage that is obtained by dividing the announced 
synergies with the combined sales prior to the merger.  
The industry average of the automotive sector is 1%. So on average, the announced synergies 
were about 1% of the combined pre-merger sales.  
In order to get the percentage, the actual revenues were necessary. The data was extracted from 
the income statements of 1997, since 1997 was the year in which the last full annual report was 
published. 
Chrysler recorded sales of $61.1 billion (Chrysler Corporation, 1998). The Daimler-Benz group 
reported revenues of 124.1 billion DM (Daimler-Benz, 1998). To convert the DM into $, the 
exchange rate of the 31st of December 1997 was applied. At the time that rate was 
0.5558$/1DM. The data was obtained from xe.com, a trusted currency authority. The converted 
sales amounted therefore to $69 billion. The combined pre-merger sales came up to a total of 
$130.1 billion. 
The percentage of the announced earnings in comparison with the combined sales was the 
following:  $1.4 / $130.1 *100 = 1.08% 
 
The final model score is computed by comparing the outcome with the table of model scores. 
Given that 𝜇 is 1.0 and  𝜎 is 0.54, the 𝑥 of 1.08 enters in the category of model score three. 
Therefore, the final score for DaimlerChrysler is 3. 
 
MODEL SCORE RULE 
0 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 − 2𝜎 
1 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 − 1𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥  𝜇 − 2𝜎 
2 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥ 𝜇 − 1𝜎 
3 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 + 1𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥ 𝜇 
4 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 + 2𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥  𝜇 + 1𝜎 
5 If 𝑥 > 𝜇 + 2𝜎 
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Cultural fit 
To assess the cultural fit of two merging companies, the model uses a modified version of the 
Berlitz COI© model as a basis for a further valuation. Both merging companies are valued from 
a “corporate culture” perspective. The ten dimensions provide a solid base for the assessment 
of the cultural fit. 
In their manual on COI©, Schmitz and Butera gave further clarifications concerning the single 
dimensions (Schmitz & Butera, n.d.). The manual explains how the different dimensions are 
applied. The table below was extracted from their work.  
Cultural 
Dimension 
Cultural 
Continuum 
Cultural Orientations  
Descriptions 
Environment Control 
 
Harmony 
People can dominate the environment; it can be 
changed to fit human needs. 
People should live in harmony with the world 
around them. 
Time Tradition oriented 
Future oriented 
High value placed on continuance of traditions. 
Willingness to trade short-term gain for long-
term results. 
Action Being 
 
 
Doing 
Relationship-centered. Stress placed on working 
for the moment; experience rather than 
accomplishment. 
Task-centered. Stress placed on productive 
activities in goal accomplishment and 
achievement. 
Communication Direct 
 
 
Indirect 
Preference for explicit one- or two-way 
communication, including identification, 
diagnosis and management of conflict. 
Preference for implicit communication and 
conflict avoidance. 
Space Private 
 
Public 
Individual orientation to the use of physical 
space. Preference for distance between 
individuals. 
Group orientation to the use of physical space. 
Preference for close proximity. 
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Power Hierarchy 
 
Equality 
Value placed on power differences between 
individuals and groups. 
Value placed on the minimization of levels of 
power. 
Individualism Individualistic 
 
Collectivistic 
The “I” predominates over the “we.” 
Independence is highly valued. 
Individual interests are subordinate to group 
interests. Identity is based on the social network. 
Loyalty is highly valued. 
Competitiveness Competitive 
 
Cooperative 
Achievement, assertiveness and material success 
are reinforced. 
Stress is placed on the quality of life, 
interdependence and relationships. 
Structure Order 
 
Flexibility 
High need for predictability and rules, written 
and unwritten. The unexpected is not valued. 
Tolerance of unpredictable situations and 
ambiguity. Dissent is acceptable. 
Thinking Deductive 
Inductive 
Reasoning based on theory and logic. 
Reasoning based on experience and 
experimentation. 
Table 8 - Source: Technical Manual Summary, Butera & Schmitz 
Following their interpretations of the single dimensions, the next step consisted in evaluating 
the different corporate cultures of Daimler-Benz on the one hand and Chrysler Corp. on the 
other. 
Starting with the environmental valuation, major differences between the German and the 
American style were explored. Hedderich concluded that people in Germany were more 
focused on work and were less involved in social interactions. In addition to that, doors in 
German offices are mainly closed, whereas in the United States more open office systems are 
prominent. Therefore, the work environment in Daimler-Benz could be described as “control” 
oriented, while Chrysler’s work environment struck a more “harmonic” tone (Hedderich, 2010). 
Germans try to keep their good reputation. The German system focuses strongly on the 
continuance of traditions such as the focus on quality. The “made in Germany” label is 
perceived as being synonymous with an obligation to continuously deliver high quality and 
being respectful of an olden German tradition. Instead, the American system is much more 
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innovation driven. Its general attitude is to learn from the past and do things better in the future. 
Which is why the “tradition” oriented and “future” oriented labels were believed to be most 
reminiscent of the two systems.  
Within the “action” dimension some noticeable differences with respect to the two systems 
could be found. Schmidt confirmed the public perception that Americans focus more on acting 
and doing (“getting things done”), while their German colleagues have more regard for the 
“being”, which is to say academic titles, ranks, and certifications. (Schmidt, 2004) 
Communication in American companies occurs in a different way compared to their German 
counterparts. Hedderich (2010), in his work about the German-American Inter-Cultural 
differences, confirmed the aforementioned perception of a more formal communication style 
within German corporations. Work colleagues in Germany prefer formal correspondence by 
applying the polite form, whereas within American corporations a more informal language 
tends to dominate. 
As was already mentioned, Americans prefer the open office system, where ideas are shared 
through an open workspace. Germans, on the other hand, are more comfortable with private 
office policies, where a certain degree of physical distance is at all times maintained between 
colleagues. As a result, the label for Daimler-Benz was “private”, while the one used for 
Chrysler was “public”.  
The “power” dimension describes the hierarchical structure of a company. Companies 
concerned with equality focus on the minimization of levels of power. The opposite describes 
clear and substantial power differences between individuals and groups. Back in 1998, both, 
the Americans and the Germans, applied the hierarchic system.  
Schmidt (2004) in his paper on non-conventional truths about American-German businesses, 
concluded that Germans are more inclined to see themselves as part of a collective, whereas 
Americans subordinate the common good to individual needs. The outcome was therefore that 
the “individualism” dimension in Daimler-Benz was labeled as “collectivistic”, while the 
American Chrysler was labeled as “individualistic”.  
Regarding the “competitive” spirit of corporations in Germany and America, it is generally 
agreed that both share a competitive environment. Personal achievements and material success 
are encouraged in both cultures. Schmidt confirmed that both cultures are ambitious and 
competitive (Schmidt, 2004). 
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Both companies also differ in terms of their internal structure. Hedderich (2010) found 
substantial differences in the organization of German corporations in comparison to their 
American counterparts. Germans prefer structure and rules. To them it is important that 
responsibilities are regulated and work times maintained. Meanwhile, Americans appreciate 
flexible organizational structures. 
The last of the ten dimensions is the “thinking” dimension. The task is to analyze how the 
reasoning in a corporation occurs. The deductive approach is to base the companies rationale 
on logic and theory. Daimler-Benz in particular and German corporations in general prefer this 
method over the inductive approach, where experience and experimentation prevail. Americans 
definitely apply the inductive method. 
The table below summarizes all outcomes of the cultural valuation. It becomes immediately 
evident that Daimler-Benz and Chrysler have faced significant cultural differences.  
Dimension Options Daimler-Benz Chrysler Corp. 
Environment control/harmonic control harmonic 
Time traditions oriented/ future oriented tradition future 
Action being/doing being doing 
Communication 
formal & indirect/informal & 
direct 
formal informal 
Space private/public private public 
Power hierarchy/equality hierarchy hierarchy 
Individualism individualistic/collectivistic collectivistic individualistic 
Competitiveness competitive/cooperative competitive competitive 
Structure order/flexibility order flexibility 
Thinking deductive/inductive deductive inductive 
Table 9 - Assessment of Cultural Fit 
The final score of the cultural fit is computed by finding the total number of dimensional 
matches. In the case of Daimler-Benz and Chrysler only two matches could be found. Each 
match corresponds with a 0.5 incremental in the final score, as it was in the described model 
design. Therefore, the total score for Daimler-Chrysler was: 
CF = 2 * 0.5 = 1 
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Strategic fit 
The third axis of the valuation model consists of the strategic fit. As already described, a 
strengths and weaknesses analysis in five different fields is conducted. The comparison with 
the merger candidate consequently allows the two companies to complement their strengths and 
weaknesses which in turn increases the strategic fit score.  
A) MARKETS  
 Daimler-Benz  Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Strong presence on the 
European Market 
Strong market position in the U.S. 
Weaknesses:  Little market share in 
America 
Insignificant market share outside 
U.S. 
The complementation in the market segment was considered to be almost perfect. Both 
companies had their strengths and weaknesses in the U.S. and European market respectively. 
The full score of one point was applied. 
B) PRODUCTS 
 Daimler-Benz  Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Well-diversified product 
portfolio 
Strong brands in the mid-sized 
car segment 
Weaknesses:  Low volumes and little 
economies of scale 
Little diversification  
In the product field, both companies had a potential strategic fit. Given lack of diversification 
in its portfolio, Chrysler could have benefited from a merger with Daimler. Daimler already 
had a diversified portfolio with a great reputation in the high-end segment. This had been further 
complemented by the gain in experience in the compact class segment after the launch of the A 
class. In addition to that, the sales of Chrysler could have compensated for Daimler’s low 
volumes of production. Potential economies of scale were high, which led to a total score for 
products; a perfect match.  
C) TECHNOLOGY 
 Daimler-Benz  Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Large number of patents Cheap and large scale technology 
Weaknesses:  Little experience in the SUV 
and compact segment 
Lack of technical innovation 
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In the case of technology, Daimler was significantly leading in terms of innovations. A merger 
could have brought substantial benefits for Chrysler by adopting some of Daimler’s patents. 
Daimler, on the other hand, was relatively unexperienced in the SUV and the compact car 
market, which were considered to be growing markets. Chrysler’s strength in producing engines 
and gearboxes at low cost, however, was not of great help to Daimler. Their claim for quality 
would not be met by Chrysler’s technology. Consequently, the total score in the technology 
field was 0.5. 
D) EFFICIENCY 
 Daimler-Benz  Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Modern and efficient 
assembling plants 
Low design cost 
Weaknesses:  Labor intensive Low quality of products 
Daimler-Benz was known for its labor intense high-quality products. Daimler-Benz had 
optimized the factors around the manual labor, while Chrysler was particularly strong in 
designing new low cost models. By sharing platforms and technologies, they achieved 
significant cost reductions in comparison with its competitors. Despite potential savings and 
synergies, it was generally known that Daimler-Benz was not interested in sharing its plants. 
Furthermore, the Germans were obsessed with their product quality and therefore would never 
implement less costly components of Chrysler, which were considered to be low in quality. 
Hence, the total score for the efficiency dimension was zero.  
E) PERFORMANCE 
 Daimler-Benz  Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Solid margins Strong sales growth 
Weaknesses:  Low growth rates in the 
passenger car sector 
Low diversification across income 
streams 
Back in the 90ies, the Chrysler Corporation showed strong sales growth and was able to satisfy 
the taste of its consumers with old-fashioned American cars. However, experts criticized the 
lack of diversification in its income stream. Chrysler was mainly dependent on its U.S. sales. 
In comparison to Chrysler, Daimler-Benz, especially its passenger car division, produced low 
rates of growth, but solid margins. The passenger division was already well known for these 
characteristics. However, the management was of the opinion that the division was too small in 
scale in order to compete in a more and more concentrated business environment. A merger of 
both corporations could have brought on a significant diversification of income. Also, the 
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different growth rates had the potential of complementing each other perfectly. The overall 
score was one.  
To calculate the total strategic fit score, the outcomes of the single dimensions were simply 
summed up: 
Strategic fit = 1+1+0.5+0+1 = 3.5 
Merger plan valuation 
The fourth and last category to be evaluated was the merger plan. As already described, the 
importance of an effective post-merger integration plan is conspicuous. Most mergers fail due 
to ineffective post-merger integration plans. 
The first step of the valuation consists in assessing the type of the merger. Different kinds of 
mergers require different integration plans. The different levels of integration range from the 
standalone category, which describes a complete separation, to a merger of equals that 
corresponds with a partial integration, on to the full-integration category.  
The table below determines the integration level of the Daimler-Chrysler merger.  
 
One of the dimensions identifies the level of integration regarding the brands of the merging 
companies. For Daimler-Benz and Chrysler it was clear that brands on both sides would be kept 
as independent brands. Therefore, the standalone category was applied. 
The second category of sales is comprised of the integration level regarding sales and 
distribution networks. If both firms are willing to cross-sell their products and to jointly use 
their distribution networks, the result is a full-integration.  
In the case of Daimler-Chrysler, both companies wanted to expand geographically and sell more 
of their products in America and Europe respectively. The access to its distributor network was 
Integration level determination Standalone 
Merger of 
Equals 
Full-
integration 
Brands +0.5 0 -0.5 
Sales +0.5 0 -0.5 
Personnel & Culture +0.5 0 -0.5 
Operations & Supply Chain +0.5 0 -0.5 
Administration +0.5 0 -0.5 
Table 10 - Integration Level Determination 
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granted partially. Given its brand policy, a more intense collaboration on the sales side would 
be hard to achieve. To apply the “merger of equals” category is therefore advisable.  
Concerning the integration level of the personnel and culture, both companies were initially 
committed to at least partially integrate their corporate cultures. Huge programs for cultural 
awareness were launched. In addition to that, a company owned jet provided the possibility for 
mid-level managers to visit and get to know their colleagues in the states better. The category 
of “merger of equals” was adopted for the personnel category. 
On the operations side, both corporations were hoping to exploit the potential synergies in the 
combined purchasing power and supplier selection. However, given the different products and 
quality requirements, the synergies were limited to a certain extend. Therefore, also for this 
category the neutral valuation of “merger of equals” was chosen. 
The last dimension is formed by the administration. Chrysler and Daimler-Benz were not 
interested in fully-integrating their administration structures and headquarters. From an 
administrational point of view, both merging companies remained totally independent.   
Summing the up the outcome, the overall score for the integration level is obtained.  
IL = 0.5 +0+0+0+0.5 = +1 
The second step of the merger integration plan valuation consists in assessing the quality of the 
merger plan itself. Here again, the valuation is formed by five different dimensions that can be 
negative, neutral or positive.  
Merger plan valuation negative neutral positive 
Commitment -0.5 0 +0.5 
Resources -0.5 0 +0.5 
Experience -0.5 0 +0.5 
Necessity -0.5 0 +0.5 
Communication -0.5 0 +0.5 
Table 11 - Merger Plan Valuation 
The management and especially Daimler’s CEO Schrempp proudly announced the merger as a 
milestone in the history of the corporations. They said that both sides would be fully committed 
to bring the merger to a successful close. If the merger had been evaluated back in the late 90ies, 
the outcome would have been mainly positive. Both sides seemed to be prepared for the 
integration. However, soon after the merger, Schrempp publicly stated that the so-called merger 
of equals was nothing more than a slogan. For Schrempp, Chrysler was just another acquisition. 
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Considering those facts, the valuation has to be adjusted. The neutral state was selected in order 
to reflect both the announced commitment and Schrempp’s statement to better understand the 
Germans’ mindset. 
Based on the provided resources, both companies seem to have taken the merger quite seriously 
as they provided considerable funds to overcome cultural obstacles. On the other hand, an 
exchange of technological know-how never occurred. Again, a neutral valuation seemed to 
reflect the actual state most accurately.  
Experience forms the third dimension in the valuation model. Companies can benefit from 
previous M&A activities. As a result, mistakes are more likely to be avoided. In the case of 
Daimler-Benz and Chrysler, it was generally agreed that both companies had experience with 
M&As. However, cross-border mergers, especially of that scale, were new territory for both 
companies. A negative valuation must therefore be attributed.  
The need to merge with another enterprise can increase the pressure on the management and 
therefore lead to more sophisticated merger plans and higher commitment during the integration 
phase. “Necessity” can come from various sources: financial or regulatory reasons are just some 
examples. Daimler-Benz and Chrysler stated that the merger was needed in order to survive the 
future challenges. In reality, looking back one might assume that this perception rested on 
personal believes, more than on sound financial research. From a financial, regulatory or 
strategic point, they were not obliged to merge with each other. This lack of necessity 
corresponds with less pressure to succeed. The final valuation should therefore be negative.  
Finally, the communication quality is assessed. A clear and immediate communicational 
concept can diminish information discrepancies and uncertainty across all stakeholders of the 
corporation. Daimler-Chrysler did inform its shareholders and personnel about the merger 
relatively quickly. Problems arose after the merger. There was no communication with regard 
to possible solutions to problems came to light during the integration. The leadership was weak 
and the personnel and suppliers were mainly kept in the dark. The overall perception of the 
communication plan must therefore be negative. 
The last step is to sum up the five different scores according to the rules of the model: 
MPV = 0+0+(-0.5)+(-0.5)+0 = -1 
Is has to be recalled, that the final score for the merger plan in the valuation model is computed 
by starting from 2.5 and adding the outcomes of the IL(integration level) and the MPV (merger 
plan valuation). 
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The total score was therefore: 
MP = 2.5 +1 -1 = 2.5 
 
DaimlerChrysler – The outcome 
After the completion of the axes’ valuation, each score is plotted in a coordinate system. 
Subsequently, all four scores are connected. The trapezoidal figure indicates the overall 
compatibility of the two merging companies and therefore the probability of success.  
The size of the surface is calculated by dividing the trapezium into four triangles. The 
computation is then done through the application of the proper mathematical formula. 
 
Table 12 - Calculation of the area in the case of DaimlerChrysler 
In the case of DaimlerChrysler, the area was 11.4, rounded to one decimal. The total fit 
corresponded therefore with 11.4 out of 50 maximal points. The low cultural fit limited the 
chances of a successful merger.  
7.5.2 Application of the model – The Fiat-Chrysler Case 
To compare the two different mergers, it is necessary to apply the same valuation model to the 
Fiat-Chrysler case. The aim was to find reasons for the success of this case.  
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Synergies 
Like in the case of DaimlerChrysler, the task was to analyze the potential synergies of a Fiat 
Chrysler merger and to compare them with the industry average. However, the case of Fiat and 
Chrysler has some major differences compared with DaimlerChrysler.  
First, it has to be recalled, that the merger of Fiat and Chrysler started with a 35% stake 
acquisition in Chrysler by Fiat. Over the years, the participation was gradually extended until, 
in 2014, Fiat bought all of the outstanding shares. From a legal perspective, the merger occurred 
when Fiat and Chrysler merged into FCA on October 12 2014. However, most of the synergies 
have been realized already in advance.  
For a fair comparison of the two mergers, the date of the evaluation had to be comparable. In 
addition to that, Fiat has not released any official statements regarded the targeted synergies. 
Even though they named synergies such as the exchange of technology, the access to their 
distribution network and the shared development of new models, they did not release any 
numbers concerning the potential cost reductions and improved sales. 
Therefore, information on the quantification of all synergies does not directly stem from a single 
source. Bertoldi et. al. (2015) stated in their paper that the most important synergies were the 
following: 
 Introduction of world-class manufacturing (WCM) 
 Cost savings on purchases 
It was forecasted that the implementation of WCM at Fiat would generate €1.9 billion of savings 
during the 5 year time period of 2010-2014. Through the acquisition of Chrysler, Fiat would 
also start to implement the WCM system at Chrysler’s plants. It was expected that the 
cumulative savings of Chrysler would amount to €1 billion in the same time period. Breaking 
these forecasts down to an annual basis, it would appear that Chrysler saved €200 million per 
year through the merger and the adoption of Fiat’s system.  
Even more important were the potential savings that could be achieved through the combined 
purchasing power of both corporations. The merger would make it possible to reach a mass 
large enough to generate consistent and substantial savings on purchases. Bertoldi et. al. (2015) 
expected that the total savings would be approximately €5 billion over that 5-year time span. 
This would have corresponded to an annual saving potential of 1€ billion. The total of both 
fields would amount to €1.2 billion in annual savings.  
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Since those were the only quantifiable potential synergies, it was necessary to immediately 
move on to the final comparison of the combined sales and the industry average: 
Like in the case of DaimlerChrysler, the potential synergies were divided by the combined pre-
merger sales. In the case of Fiat Chrysler, the data was extracted from the annual statements of 
2008, which is the year prior to the acquisition.  
Fiat (2009) announced revenues of €59.38 billion.. Chrysler, on the other hand, at the time was 
controlled by the private equity firm Cerberus Capital Management. Since they were not 
publicly listed, the management did not have to disclose financial data. However, several rating 
agencies and financial data providers tried to estimate Chrysler’s sales. Forbes (2009) estimated 
that the revenues of Chrysler stood at $47.6 billion. 
The number had to be converted into one single currency, in order to be used for further 
valuations. Like in the previous analysis of DaimlerChrysler, the exchange rate of the 31st 
December 2008 was applied. At the time, the Euro stood at 1.392$/€. The data was again 
extracted from the portal xe.com. Chrysler’s estimated sales amounted therefore to a total of 
€34.20 billion ($47.6/1.392= €34.20 billion). The combined sales were: €59.38 + €34.20 = 
€93.58 billion.  
The percentage of the announced earnings in comparison with the combined sales was: 
€1.2 / €93.58 *100 = 1.28% 
It is important to reiterate that industry average of automotive sector is 1%. So on average, the 
announced synergies were about 1% of the combined sales pre-merger.  
 
The final model score is computed by comparing the outcome with the table of model scores. 
Given that 𝜇 is 1.0 and 𝜎 is 0.54, the 𝑥 of 1.28 enters in the category of model score three. 
Therefore, also for Fiat Chrysler the final score is 3. 
  
MODEL SCORE RULE 
0 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 − 2𝜎 
1 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 − 1𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥  𝜇 − 2𝜎 
2 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥ 𝜇 − 1𝜎 
3 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 + 1𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥ 𝜇 
4 If 𝑥 < 𝜇 + 2𝜎 𝑎𝑛𝑑 ≥  𝜇 + 1𝜎 
5 If 𝑥 > 𝜇 + 2𝜎 
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Cultural fit: 
The cultural fit, as the second important axis of compatibility measurement, indicates how 
compatible the two merging companies are from a cultural point of view. Chrysler’s corporate 
culture has already been evaluated in the Daimler-Chrysler case. Moreover, the cultural changes 
that took place over the ten years timespan were minor and can therefore be disregarded. Some 
of the characteristics have intensified over the years. The corporate culture in the U.S. and 
within Chrysler became even more flexible, informal and collectivistic compared to how it was 
back in the late 90ies. Therefore, the cultural attributes of Chrysler were not reevaluated.  
Dimension Options Fiat Chrysler Corp. 
Environment control/harmonic harmonic harmonic 
Time traditions oriented/ future oriented tradition future 
Action being/doing doing doing 
Communication 
formal & indirect/informal & 
direct 
formal informal 
Space private/public private public 
Power hierarchy/equality equality hierarchy 
Individualism individualistic/collectivistic individualistic individualistic 
Competitiveness competitive/cooperative competitive competitive 
Structure order/flexibility flexibility flexibility 
Thinking deductive/inductive inductive inductive 
Table 13 - Assessment of Cultural Fit 
The evaluation of Fiat’s corporate culture correlated significantly with the assessment of the 
Italian business culture. However, Marchionne’s footprint on the corporate culture of Fiat was 
significant.  
Fiat’s working environment was mainly considered as harmonic. In an Italian corporation, 
social interactions are important. The focus lies not only on work, like in the case of Daimler-
Benz. Italians also tend to build friendships with their work colleagues. The American 
counterpart, Chrysler, shares this attitude.  
Despite changes in its strategy and its vision, Fiat was still tradition oriented. Marchionne did 
not touch its core values such as design, emotions, and excellent performance, even though he 
pushed for a more future oriented vision with new models, ways of working and strategies.  
Marchionne was able to change another Italian attitude. Before his appointment, Fiat’s system 
based on “being”. Titles and hierarchy played an important role in the Italian business culture. 
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Nevertheless, Marchionne started to lay off several mangers and appointed young and 
promising talents, who were scouted by himself. Their status was depending of their 
performance. The “doing” approach and a result-based valuation have become the dominant 
factors. The action attribute was therefore “doing”. 
The differences in communication however, were still significant. The Italian way of 
communicating has been more formal compared to the Americans. Like the Germans, Italians 
use the polite “Lei” form. The overall assessment of Fiat’s communication style was therefore 
“formal”. 
Even though a trend toward a more public workspace is also appearing in Italy, the general 
perception is that the workplace is mainly private. The same held for Fiat. In comparison to the 
Americans, Italian workers prefer to individually use private space.  
The dimension “power” in Italy is characterized by hierarchical structures. Nevertheless, 
Marchionne wanted to create a more equal system in within its company. The symbol for his 
new policy was his move from the CEO office in the Fiat headquarter down to a lower level 
where most of the engineers work. Marchionne stated that he wanted to be at the heart of the 
company and not somewhere just to supervise people. He did the same later at the Chrysler 
headquarter. Those actions have underlined his commitment to fundamentally change the 
working culture. The assessment of the power in Fiat was, despite the contrary in Italy, “equal”.  
According to Hofstede (2011) and his 6-D model, which provided a good overview of the deep 
drivers of culture relative to other world cultures, the American society is one of the most 
individualistic in the world. However, Italy is not far behind. The dimension describes the self-
image of people in a society, whether the “I” or “we” prevails. Italy, and especially the more 
industrialized North, shares a strong individualistic view with the United States.  
Regarding the dimension “competitiveness”, it has to be said that Italy, such as Germany and 
the U.S., is generally considered as a competitive society. Hofstede (2011) explains it with the 
masculinity dimension. According to him, Italy is highly success oriented and driven. Children 
are taught that competition is favorable and to be a winner is something good. Competition 
among working colleagues can be very strong as well.  
Like with the action dimension, the footprint of Marchionne’s policy is also appearing in the 
structure of the company. In general, Italian companies are characterized by a hierarchical 
system with a strong leader at the top. However, Marchionne pushed for a more flexible system 
where anybody is replaceable. Despite the fact, that Fiat was not at the same level of flexibility 
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compared to Chrysler back when the merger occurred, the flexibility however prevailed over 
order. 
Finally, in the assessment of the way of thinking another similarity has been revealed. Italians 
also prefer the inductive way of thinking. Most of the knowledge is based on experience and 
experiments and not, like in German cultures, based on theory and logic. Already the most 
important cornerstone of Italian culture, namely food, is based on experiences probably back in 
childhood where the grandmother prepared her best pasta. Italians tend to apply that principle 
also at work. Therefore, the dimension’s attribute was “inductive”.  
The total cultural fit (CF) is computed by counting the similarities of both corporate cultures 
and by multiplying them with 0.5 points. The outcome in the comparison of Fiat’s and 
Chrysler’s working culture was the following: 
CF = 6 * 0.5 = 3 
Strategic fit 
A) MARKETS  
 Fiat Automobiles  Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Still strong position on the 
Italian and Brazilian market 
Strong market position in the U.S. 
Weaknesses:  Little market share in the rest 
of the world 
Insignificant market share outside 
U.S. 
The complementation in the market segment was again like in the DaimlerChrysler case 
considered as almost perfect. Both companies had their strengths and weaknesses in the U.S. 
and European market respectively. Fiat as well as Chrysler was committed to expand globally. 
The applied score was the maximum possible, one.  
B) PRODUCTS 
 Fiat Automobiles Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Strong in compact and super 
sports class 
Strong brands in the mid-sized 
car segment 
Weaknesses:  Little or no presence in 
important segments as SUV 
Little diversification  
In the product dimension, Fiat had a comparable position to Daimler, even though the focus 
was on different segments. Fiat with its experience in the compact car class as well as in the 
super sports segment with Ferrari and Maserati complemented Chrysler in a perfect way. 
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Chrysler with its mid-sized cars was seeking for more diversification. Hence, they have 
obtained the full score of one.  
C) TECHNOLOGY 
 Fiat Automobiles Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Fuel-efficient small engines Reliable and cheap big block 
engines 
Weaknesses:  Little experience alternative 
powertrains, especially hybrids 
Unexperienced with small engines 
Regarding the technology, Chrysler was known for its lack in technical innovations compared 
to its competitors. Moreover, new environmental regulations threatened the company because 
its inefficient engines would not pass the upcoming provisions. Fiat and its rewarded fuel-
efficient twin and multiair engines fitted perfectly to Chrysler. On the other hand, Fiat’s 
weakness regarding alternative powertrains would not be complemented by Chrysler. Chrysler 
had its strength in the production of cheap and reliable big block engines, such as V8s and V6s. 
However, they would not be useful in a merger with Chrysler. 
The total score for the technology field was therefore 0.5. 
D) EFFICIENCY 
 Fiat Automobiles Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  World-class manufacturing 
system 
Lowest manufacturing cost 
Weaknesses:  High costs in Italian plants Low investments in further 
improvements 
Fiat after the appointment of Marchionne has shown a remarkable recovery. Many 
improvements in every department were made. Especially the introduction of the WCM (world-
class manufacturing system) led the cost decrease significantly. Despite those substantial 
improvements, its Italian plants were still ineffective in comparison with its competitors in 
Europe. The strong labor unions had blocked further provisions. Chrysler on the other hand, 
had still the lowest manufacturing cost across the carmakers. However, given the deep financial 
crisis, there was no room for further investments.  
From a strategic point, a merger of both could bring significant synergies by implementing the 
WCM also in Chrysler plants and by sharing some of the low-cost platforms. However, the 
burden of strong labor unions would still exist. Therefore, only 0.5 points were considered. 
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E) PERFORMANCE 
 Fiat Automobiles Chrysler Corp. 
Strengths:  Great recovery since 
Marchionne 
Solid margins when demand is 
normal 
Weaknesses:  High debt and limited 
competiveness 
Deep in financial troubles due to 
market sensitiveness  
In 2004, Fiat stood at the edge to bankruptcy. The newly appointed CEO Marchionne has 
managed to pull the company out of the crisis and has proven that such a recovery was and is 
possible. The recovery itself is one of the key strengths of Fiat. The optimism and the provisions 
applied could help also Chrysler with its weakness, the deep financial crisis.  
On the other hand, Fiat still has had a lot of debt. The restructuring measurements cost huge 
amounts of cash. If Fiat was able to do the same with Chrysler, Chrysler’s solid margins would 
contribute to a reduction in Fiat’s debt. The overall score hence, was one.  
Again, to calculate the total strategic fit score, the outcomes of the single dimensions were 
simply summed up: 
Strategic fit = 1+1+0.5+0.5+1 = 4 
Merger plan valuation 
Like in the analysis of the DaimlerChrysler case, the integration level has to be determined. The 
table shows the level of integration in the fusion of Fiat and Chrysler.  
Fiat and Chrysler have decided to keep most of their own 
brands. However, both corporations have also decided to 
unite certain brands, such as Fiat’s Lancia and the Chrysler brand. In addition to that, Fiat and 
Chrysler were committed to fully merge into a single entity, once they have overcome the legal 
burdens. The newly founded entity FCA (Fiat Chrysler Automobiles) has underlined a higher 
Integration level determination Standalone 
Merger of 
Equals 
Full-
integration 
Brands +0.5 0 -0.5 
Sales +0.5 0 -0.5 
Personnel & Culture +0.5 0 -0.5 
Operations & Supply Chain +0.5 0 -0.5 
Administration +0.5 0 -0.5 
Table 14 - Integration Level Determination 
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level of integration, given that their names (Fiat and Chrysler) would not be visible anymore at 
the first glimpse. The valuation of the integration level became therefore “merger of equals”. 
The sales category was characterized by the shared distribution channels. Fiat was keen to 
conquer the North-American market with its compact Fiat 500 and has planned to sell its 
product through Chrysler’s existing network. Chrysler instead, has decided to stop its effort in 
Europe and to concentrate on the important American and Asian markets. Fiat Chrysler wanted 
a partial integration and therefore the “merger of equals” category was applied.   
The management was aware of potential culture issues and has learnt something from the 
former merger of DaimlerChrysler. A full integration was too challenging to achieve. 
Therefore, like in the case of DaimlerChrysler, Fiat applied a compromise. Chrysler remained 
an American company entrenched in North America and Fiat an Italian carmaker entrenched in 
Italy. However, the exchange of knowledge and experience was warmly welcomed and 
encouraged. Such as DaimlerChrysler, the integration level was considered as “merger of 
equals”. 
Regarding the operations and its supplier, FCA wanted to share assembling capacities and 
optimize operations in general. The implementation of the WCM system would reduce cost 
drastically. In addition to that, suppliers were reviewed and optimized under the aspect of 
economies of scale. Since most of the plants, however, remained in the hands of Chrysler and 
Fiat respectively, it cannot be said that a full integration occurred. Again, the category of 
“merger and equals” was chosen.  
The category of administration was influenced by the decision to transfer the headquarter to the 
Netherlands. However, the corporation is still managed from the offices in Torino and Auburn 
Hills. Both companies have tried to integrate as many departments as possible. They work 
together in research and development, marketing and legal issues. The valuation chosen was 
again “merger of equals”.  
By summing the outcomes up, the overall score for integration level is obtained.  
IL = 0+0+0+0+0 = 0 
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The second part was again the merger plan valuation.  
Merger plan valuation negative neutral positive 
Commitment -0.5 0 +0.5 
Resources -0.5 0 +0.5 
Experience -0.5 0 +0.5 
Necessity -0.5 0 +0.5 
Communication -0.5 0 +0.5 
Table 15 - Merger plan evaluation 
The commitment during the merger of Fiat and Chrysler was outstandingly high. Chrysler 
wanted to avoid another disaster such with the merger with Daimler-Benz. In addition to that, 
the public pressure on Chrysler was more intense. The fact that they had received capital 
injections from the government urged them to work hard to find a solution. Carmaker Fiat 
instead, had changed its corporate culture significantly since the appointment of Marchionne. 
The general commitment to implement new ideas and concepts was higher. Therefore, the 
valuation of the commitment was “positive”.  
Resources used to be problematic for both, Fiat and Chrysler. Chrysler, deep into the financial 
crisis and surviving only with governmental capital injections, could not afford large 
expenditures for the merger integration plan. On the other hand, Fiat was already highly 
indebted and struggled to finance the M&A transaction. Therefore, neither Fiat could provide 
funds for financing the post-merger integration. Those facts had a negative impact on the final 
valuation, which was “negative”. 
Regarding M&A experiences in the past, both corporations were evaluated separately. Chrysler 
obviously gained valuable experience after the failed fusion with Daimler-Benz. Even though 
the experience was negative, it was helpful for further projects such as a potential merger with 
Fiat. The management of Chrysler knew where the problems with the Germans laid. Fiat had 
not any comparable experience on the international cross-border M&A market. They were 
experienced in European acquisitions, however, potential benefits from such experiences were 
limited since a cross cultural M&A at that scale was something completely different. The final 
consideration of the experience category was “neutral”. 
The fourth dimension evaluates the necessity of a merger. In the case of Fiat and Chrysler, both 
were looking for a partner. Chrysler on one hand, stood at the edge of bankruptcy and the U.S. 
government knew that without a strong partner Chrysler would not be viable anymore. On the 
other hand, Fiat was looking for a partner in order to realize economies of scale and scope to 
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be more competitive. The failed negotiations with Opel and GM paved the way for the merger 
with Chrysler. In general, it can be said the pressure on both sides was high but it was seen 
positively for a potential merger. The final valuation was therefore positive.  
The last category is formed by the communicational quality of the merger plan. Communication 
was one of the major priorities of Marchionne. He stood several times in front of thousands of 
Chrysler’s staff in Auburn hills. He knew that communicating targets and goals as well as the 
way of achieving it was key in order to gain confidence. The Americans were clearly doubtful 
whether an Italian carmaker would help Chrysler out of the deepest financial crisis in history. 
In general, the perception of the communication strategy was positive. Therefore, the final 
evaluation was “positive”.  
The last step, like in the case of DaimlerChrysler, was to summarize the five different scores 
according to the rules of the model. All five valuations were summed up: 
MPV = 0.5+(-0.5)+0+0.5+0.5 = +1 
Is has to be recalled, that the final score for the merger plan in the valuation model is computed 
by starting from 2.5 and add the outcomes of the IL(integration level) and the MPV (merger 
plan valuation). 
The total score was therefore: 
MP = 2.5 +1 = 3.5 
Fiat Chrysler – The outcome 
After the completion of the axes’ valuation, each score is plotted in a coordinate system. 
Subsequently, all four scores are connected. The trapezoidal figure indicates as described the 
overall compatibility of two merging companies and therefore the probability of success.  
The size of the surface is calculated by dividing the trapezium into four triangles. The 
computation is then done through the application of the proper mathematical formula. 
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Table 16 - Calculation of the area in the case of FiatChrysler 
In the case of Fiat Chrysler, the size of the area was 22.8, rounded to one decimal. The total fit 
corresponded therefore with 22.8 out of 50 maximal points. 
7.6 Comparison of the two mergers 
After the analysis of the single mergers, it was important to compare them directly. The model 
helps to graphically understand different compatibilities and potential hurdles. The graph below 
shows both mergers.  
 
Table 17 - Comparison DaimlerChrysler and Fiat Chrysler 
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It can be seen that the Fiat-Chrysler merger (blue) beats the DaimlerChrysler merger (orange) 
in nearly every dimension.  
Looking at the synergies, it appears that the starting point for both mergers, namely potential 
synergies and savings, was very comparable. Both have announced slightly higher saving 
potentials compared to the industry average, which has a low percentage relative to other 
industries. The preconditions for a successful merger, which are defined by a higher value of 
two combined businesses in respect to their standalone values, were given.  
Regarding the merger plan, Fiat and especially Marchionne was far more committed and 
convinced to bring the merger to a successful end. Despite the lack of experience and being 
short on resources, Fiat was able to better communicate with the American counterpart as well 
as with the public. On the other hand, Daimler invested a lot of money trying to overcome with 
cultural hurdles. However, the mindset at the top-management level was not helpful for a 
successful integration. Even though they continued to emphasize the slogan “merger of equals”, 
the Germans felt superior and acted as if the merger was another acquisition.  
Only minor differences appeared in the assessment of the strategic fit. Both, Daimler and Fiat, 
were highly compatible with Chrysler, at least from a strategic point of view. Their product 
portfolios complemented each other almost perfectly, as well as their key markets.  
The high strategic compatibility was probably the main reason for the positive resonance of 
industry experts. The doubts after the bailout of Chrysler were definitely more significant 
relative to the rumors before the announcement of the DaimlerChrysler deal. Clearly, the doubts 
were not ungrounded knowing the history of those carmakers. Nevertheless, the strategic fit has 
justified a merger in both cases.  
Finally, the cultural fit appeared as the most disturbing dimension. The cultural fit of Fiat and 
Chrysler was not perfect. The differences between the working culture in Europe and America 
were and are still significant. It was the achievement of Marchionne, who started with a new 
corporate culture after his appointment in 2004, which has changed Fiat’s culture considerably 
in respect with the average Italian corporate culture.  
Meanwhile, the Germans were almost totally incompatible with Chrysler’s corporate culture 
back in the late 90ies. The cultural ditches were deep and would have required a more 
sophisticated merger plan with higher commitment as well as an improved communication.   
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8. Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to analyze the value creation in mergers and acquisitions. Over the last 
decades, mergers and acquisitions have become an important strategic option for corporate 
growth. In addition to that, M&A operations are an important tool for carmakers in order to 
survive in an increasingly competitive environment.  
Johnson and Scholes (2008) identified four main motivations for M&A activities. First, M&A 
can occur due to economic motives, still the most important category. In addition to that, 
strategic motives and financial motives constitute the second and third group of motivations 
respectively. The fourth and last category contains the managerial motives. 
The relevance of M&A activities was subject of many empirical studies, which tried to analyze 
the performance and the success factors of such transactions. However, the outcomes were 
heterogeneous, implying that many different motives influence the probability of success.  
Nevertheless, many studies underlined the importance of the post-merger integration phase. 
Whitaker (2013) named several reasons why mergers often fail to generate value. The excessive 
focus on closing the deal instead of making the deal working or the lack of focus on operational, 
cultural, strategic and organizational assessment are just two examples.  
Jansen (2003) provided a model to address the most influential and most critical motives for a 
successful integration. His 7K model identifies the core problems in the integration process and 
prepares the management team for potential hurdles.  
Further goals of this thesis were to find the most influential success drivers in M&As and to 
analyze two case studies, the DaimlerChrysler merger, as well as the Fiat Chrysler merger. The 
fundamental task was to shed light on the reasons for the failure of the former and the success 
of the latter case study.  
In order to measure the compatibility of merging companies, a valuation model was developed. 
It includes the four most important success drivers for M&A activities, according to recent 
studies. The model provides a standardized framework that allows comparing different mergers 
and acquisitions and predicting the probability of success.  
The model was created in order to be applied during the evaluation of potential M&A targets. 
It helps to determine the overall fit of two merging companies. The model analyses the potential 
synergies, the strategic fit, the quality of the merger integration plan as well as the cultural fit 
of two companies.  
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It is important to understand that the model does not replace the due diligence process and the 
detailed analysis of a merger candidate. In addition to that, it faces several limitations. For 
instance, it should be noted that many other factors, which also influence the probability of 
success, are not included. Furthermore, given its nature, the model includes a proportioned 
weight of each of the four axes. When summing up the surfaces, every component is as 
important as the other. However, the reality could well be different. Finally, the evaluation and 
assessment of some components remain a subjective perception. The merger plan and the 
evaluation of the corporate culture cannot be based on objective facts. Therefore, 
misinterpretations might be possible.  
Despite those limitations, the model provides a useful analysis whether intensifications of M&A 
negotiations make sense or not. It could be used during presentations of potential M&A targets 
in order to inform the senior management about the overall compatibility.  
Regarding the case analysis, the model was applied to the two well-known case studies in order 
to understand conflicts in the compatibility and to find out why Chrysler’s merger with Daimler-
Benz failed, whereas the fusion of Fiat-Chrysler was successful.  
As a result of the analysis, several major differences between Fiat and Daimler-Benz were 
revealed. The overall compatibility of Fiat in respect with Daimler-Benz was superior. The 
cultural differences between Daimler-Benz and Chrysler constituted an insurmountable hurdle 
for a successful merger. The counter measurements in the post-merger plan were too ineffective 
in order to overcome with the cultural issues.  
The model has stressed out the importance of a cultural due diligence. Being aware of corporate 
cultural issues is the first important step in order to address them in an adequate way.  
Daimler-Benz focused on the exploration of synergies and was compatible with Chrysler from 
a strategic point of view. However, the management failed in integrating the very differing 
corporate cultures. On the other hand, Fiat has shown uncompromised commitment. It was 
disposed to adjust itself in order to harmonize with the new partner. The result was that Fiat and 
Chrysler unlocked most of the synergies.  
As a conclusion of this thesis, it can be said that for the analysis of a general compatibility of 
two potential merging candidates, the valuation model is recommended. However, the precise 
assessment of the compatibility in respect to operational, legal, and administrative issues has to 
be subject of studies or due diligence with a higher level of specificity.  
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